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3FOREWORD
THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL SPHERE IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM
This publication is timeous as it is published in the 10th year of freedom. It is therefore well
placed to assess what has been achieved in the first 10 years of democracy with respect to
one aspect of a massive project, that is the creation of a national health system (NHS). The
project was first described in detail in the ANC’s National Health Plan for South Africa (1995),
and in an abbreviated form in the Reconstruction and Development Plan (1994). The
frameworks presented in these documents were later included in a policy framework on the
district health system (DHS) in 1995 and in the first major comprehensive policy paper of the
Department of Health in 1997 – the White Paper for the Transformation of the Health System
in South Africa.
The White Paper refers to the RDP in outlining the long term goals and role of the health
district: “The goal outlined in the RDP is to have a single NHS, based on a district health
system that facilitates health promotion, provides universal access to essential health care
and allows for the rational planning and appropriate use of resources, including the optimal
utilisation of the private health sector resources”.
The White Paper listed 12 principles that should underpin the development of the DHS,
proposed 5 implementation strategies and listed a range of functions for a health district.
Critically the White Paper suggests that the package of health care services provided by a
health district “will be subject to the outcome of negotiations between the province and a
municipality in terms of the constitutional right of municipalities to render municipal health
services”.
Noting that a single governance model will not be possible in the short term for a variety of
now well known reasons the White Paper provided three governance options for the DHS: the
provincial option; the statutory district health authority option and the local government option.
For the latter option to be realised two conditions were listed: (a) the boundaries of the
municipality had to be the same as that of the health district; and (b) the municipality had to
have the capacity to render comprehensive services.
This publication needs to be read against the backdrop of the project of the creation of the
DHS as the foundation of the NHS. It should also be viewed against the challenges of
massive transformation of the state and all of its organs of governance within a relatively short
period of time by a cadre of relatively inexperienced (in governance and management)
politicians and technocrats.
That an NHS is well on the way on, an admittedly bumpy, road cannot be denied. Rather
sophisticated policies have been developed on a range of issues but it is often said by
supporters of the party in power and its detractors that implementation has not been easy. A
reading of this publication points to some of the reasons why implementation of the DHS in
particular and the creation of an NHS in general has been difficult.
The publication calls for a review of the decentralisation vision with specific reference to
issues of quality and the role of municipalities. It also reiterates the need to locate this project
in the vision presented in Alma Ata in 1978. Given that planning and delivering health
services necessarily involves multiple stakeholders within and outside of government, it is
critical that this document is studied by all stakeholders and that it is used as a resource to
review what has been achieved in the first 10 years of democracy and to plan what type of
health system we should be developing in the next 10 years.
Dr Yogan Pillay
Chief Director: Strategic Planning
National Department of Health
6th March 2004
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7PREFACE
This report integrates the findings of a
project monitoring the health
decentralisation process in South Africa
between 2001 and 2003. It is targeted at
senior policy makers and health
managers, although the report is also
intended to offer middle managers insights
into the situation.
Chapters One to Six are summaries of the
individual studies, which together make up
the project. Chapter 7 synthesizes the
findings, including wider insights gained
from the crosscutting nature of the project.
Chapter 8 (the Recommendations)
contains eight areas of importance for
consideration in decentralising
management within the health system on
the basis of a newly promulgated Health
Act.
Time-strapped readers are encouraged to
move directly to the final two chapters,
especially the recommendations (chapter 8),
which constitute important reading for any
role-player holding a position of influence in
national, provincial or local government-linked
health service delivery.
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Since 1994 the health system in South Africa has been undergoing reform. The national
vision for health services is primary health care (PHC) through a decentralised, municipal-
based, district health system (DHS). This is happening simultaneously with the restructuring
of government into three spheres - national, provincial and local. The roles and
responsibilities of each sphere are defined in the Constitution of 1996. The Constitution
outlines how the three spheres of government are meant to relate to each other. The
emphasis is on cooperative governance with independent, yet inter-dependent, spheres.
The demarcation of the whole country into municipalities and the local government elections
of December 2000 completed the establishment of the local sphere of government –
comprising metropolitan, district and local municipalities. The structures and systems for this
sphere are legislated through Acts such as the Municipal Structures Act and the Municipal
Systems Act.
International experience has shown that decentralisation of health services is a complex and
fragile process. Care is needed to prevent increasing inequity, increased administrative costs,
fragmentation, and avoid any weakening in strategic direction, national coordination and
cohesion. (Collins and Green, 1993)  In order to prevent this, the decentralisation process
needs to be carefully monitored on an on-going basis.
The dual decentralisation processes referred to above have had a significant impact on health
service delivery in the country.  In the absence of a legislative framework within which to
implement the DHS decentralisation activities have vacillated as likely policy has changed.
Constitutionally municipal health services (MHS) are a local government responsibility, but the
term was not defined.  Early expectations were that MHS would include all of PHC services –
firstly with and then later without Level 1 hospitals.  Personnel at district level put great effort
into implementing this concept.  Recent developments however, pointed towards MHS being
limited to a list of environmental health services only.  Results on the ground were a feeling of
futile endeavour and demoralized staff. The pending National Health Act ostensibly returns to
provincial control ‘the rest of’ PHC, with the option to delegate or assign PHC functions to
local government – now the only way of achieving the stated aim of a municipal-based district
health system.
The Minister of Provincial and Local Government specified MHS as a district municipality
responsibility, although much of the work is currently being performed by local municipalities.
Provision is made for local municipalities to undertake the work on an agency basis and
implementation is due in July 2004.
The monitoring and research project, “Local Government and Health in South Africa” (LGH),
was established during the latter half of 2001 to monitor and track the impact of the policy to
decentralise health services to local government.  The name reflects the early trend that
suggested the inclusion of more of the primary level services in the definition of Municipal
Health Services (MHS).  The project was established by a consortium of founding partners,
involving the Health Systems Trust (HST), the Centre for Health Policy (CHP), University of
Witwatersrand, the Health Economics Unit (HEU), University of Cape Town and the Centre
for Policy Studies (CPS), Johannesburg.  The LGH Consortium was fully funded by the Health
Systems Trust.
Conceptually, the project used a framework of five policy-related themes – equity, local
accountability and community involvement, inter-sectoral collaboration, inter-governmental
relations, and public-private relationships - all relating to the sixth under-pining theme of
improving service delivery and quality of care.
9Methodological framework
While aspects of the research looked at the impact and process of decentralisation at a
country and province-wide level, some of the studies focused on ’tracer’ (or sentinel) sites.
These sites acted as in-depth case studies and as ’windows’ through which the complexities
of health systems development and change could be viewed.  Selection of the sites, one per
province, aimed at covering the broad range of health systems and local government contexts
and scenarios that exist in the country and included rural / urban; well resourced / poorly
resourced; previous homeland / previous RSA; cross boundary district municipality and metro
council.
Overview of the chapters
Chapter 1 includes at the current financing of health services and how these impact on equity
of distribution. A macro view reviews the funding processes and distribution of funds from
national and provincial levels.  A micro analysis looks at resource allocation within three
district or metro municipalities.
Chapter 2 explains the present system of distributing transport for health services and, some
of the challenges that health officials face in ensuring that transport is available for delivery of
health services.
Chapter 3 investigates vertical integration in service delivery, focusing on the changing
relationships between spheres of government and the impact on service delivery, using
HIV/AIDS services as a tracer.
The referral system and relationships between clinics and level 1 hospitals is also illustrated.
Chapter 4 looks at the role of local government in relation to health services and the
accountability of local government councillors to the community, mainly through other
governance structures.
Chapter 5 investigates the health content of a selection of Integrated Development Plans
(IDPs) and the involvement of health officials in the IDP process.
Chapter 6 is an introductory analysis and overview of Public-Private Interactions (PPIs) in the
South African health system.
Chapters 7 and 8 are the synthesis of the findings referred to in the preceding chapters.
Chapter 7 reports on the progress of the decentralisation process whilst Chapter 8 looks
ahead at future challenges.
The full reports of each of these chapters are available from the Health Systems Trust
website (www.hst.org.za).
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Chapter 1
Financing and Equity
Steve Thomas1, Sandi Mbatsha1, Okore Okorafor1, Debbie Muirhead1,
Deus Mubangizi1, Gugu Khumalo2, Itumeleng Funani2, Lucy Gilson2, 3
1 Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town
2 Centre for Health Policy, University of Witwatersrand
3 Health Economics and Financing Programme1 of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Background
Despite almost ten years of democracy there has been no research that evaluates
comprehensively the distribution of funding of Primary Health Care (PHC) across districts.
There are international fears that decentralisation may negatively impact on the fair
distribution of such resources. This is especially concerning for South Africa given the legacy
of apartheid and the importance of equity in Government policy. It is vital that decentralisation
must be developed with equity in mind, protecting those in greatest need. This chapter
evaluates the equity of PHC financing within the context of recent debates about
decentralisation to local government. It draws together four reports which analyse the overall
financing of, and need for, non-hospital PHC across districts and present findings from case
studies of resource allocation within health districts (Thomas et al, 2003; Mubangizi et al,
2003; Khumalo et al, 2003; Okorafor et al, 2003). The different approaches and their findings
are complementary and yield conclusions and recommendations to be implemented at
different levels of government to improve the performance of the health system.
International experience of the interaction of decentralisation on health care financing is
summarised. The objectives of and some discussion of methods used in the studies are
discussed. Results detailing the overall financing of non-hospital PHC in relation to need are
then presented as an exploration of budgeting practices in the case studies. Conclusions and
recommendations follow.
                                                
The full report on this research, of which the chapter is a summary, can be downloaded in pdf format
from  www.hst.org.za
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Without understanding
how resources are
allocated, and who
effectively takes the
decisions, it is difficult
to pursue equity through
effective policy change.
International Experience
Decentralisation, in its various guises, has proved to be a very popular reform in many
developing countries (Brijlal et al 1998). Yet, it is often complex and characterised by political
conflict between different spheres of government (Mills et al 1990; Collins 1996). Most
importantly, one threat of decentralisation is to the equity of health care financing across
geographical populations. As decentralisation progresses to lower levels of the system local
sources of finance become increasingly important. If there is no effective vehicle for cross
subsidy between wealthier and poorer populations, then inequities are likely to increase
(Collins et al, 1996). While decentralisation may encourage additional resource generation at
the local level (Collins et al, 1996), it may also result in fragmentation of funding with little
overall coordination (Brijlal et al 1998, Mills et al 1990). All this points to the need for strong
central oversight of financing to redress problems of inequity and manage, if not rationalise,
fragmentation of funding.
Rationale and objectives
While much has been published on inter-provincial inequities
(see Thomas et al, 2000; McIntyre et al, 1998; McIntyre et al,
1995), little is known about the equity of financing primary
health care across health districts in South Africa. Further,
given that PHC is a key government policy, it is vital for
policy makers and planners to understand the current
funding picture, its implications for equity and the changes
that need to be made to move the health system closer to
stated goals. Indeed, it is a goal of the National Department of Health to have every public
PHC facility offer a comprehensive package of PHC services by 2004 (Makan et al, 2003). To
provide a foundation for such an approach it is also important that policy makers are aware of
the resource allocation practices on the ground, particularly in relation to intra-district
budgeting.
Consequently, the objectives for the studies were:
Across the country:
♦ To map the financing of non-hospital primary health care within all local government
areas
♦ To construct deprivation indices for the country as a whole and for each province to
measure the need for health care services
♦ To analyse the equity of financing health care in relation to need across all health districts
♦ To propose changes to improve the equitable allocation of resources.
In case study sites:
♦ To document and evaluate the decision-making process and mechanisms at different
levels of government that determine the allocation of resources within the local
government areas
♦ To analyse how such decision-making processes impact on equity within local
government areas
♦ To propose changes to resource allocation practices to improve equity across local
municipality areas within a health district.
Methods
The studies used both quantitative and qualitative methods. A picture of financing was pieced
together from data provided by Provincial Departments of Health, Provincial Treasuries,
National Treasury and National Department of Provincial and Local Government in
accordance with the funding flows described below. Deprivation data were calculated to
reflect need for health care using key socio-economic indicators based on census data.
Further semi-structured interviews were conducted with key officials and politicians from the
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National
TreasuryProvincial
Treasuries
Provincial
Departments
of Health
District and Metro
Municipalities
Local
Municipalities
Non-
hospital
PHC
services
Own
Revenue
There is no formal
mechanism to protect
funding of PHC
activities at any stage in
this resource allocation
process.
The substantial fragmentation of funding of non-hospital PHC
makes coordination of equitable financing difficult.
case study sites and the relevant Provincial Departments of Health. These methods are
discussed briefly below. The study also built on earlier research on the options for financing
local government health services (Mbatsha and McIntyre, 2002).
Outline of Funding Flows
The financing of non-hospital PHC services is currently quite
fragmented. Indeed, the overall funding relationships in the
public health sector are complex. To understand the methods
used for data collection it is necessary to map out the funding
flows. This is shown in Diagram 1.1. National Treasury
allocates funds to provinces and local governments in the
form of block grants (the equitable share) and conditional
grants (for earmarked purposes) (National Treasury, 2002).
Provincial Treasuries must allocate these funds across sectors, such as health, education and
so on through their own budget process. Provincial Departments of Health then allocate the
funds they receive from provincial Treasury to different activities, such as district hospitals,
clinics and so on. There is no formal mechanism to protect funding of PHC activities at any
stage in this resource allocation process.
Diagram 1.1: Representation of Funding Flows Relating to PHC
Provincial Departments of Health contribute to the funding of non-hospital PHC in two ways;
through their direct expenditure on provincial health programmes and clinics and through
transfers that they make to local government for such activities. These transfers can go to As
(metropolitan councils), Bs (local municipalities) or Cs (district municipalities), though there
are relatively few transfers to district municipalities at present. Transfers may take the form of
contracts or subsidies (Mbatsha and McIntyre, 2002). The equitable share grant and
conditional grants to local government currently go to the B level (local municipalities).
Historically, these funds were not mandated for health care services but for the core
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responsibilities of municipalities, including housing, water and sanitation. Nevertheless, there
is some suggestion that some local governments may utilise these funds for health care. In
addition local governments raise their own funds for health care through local rates and tariffs,
and this has grown to be quite an important source of funding in some districts (Thomas et al,
2000). The substantial fragmentation of funding of non-hospital PHC makes coordination of
equitable financing difficult, as will be explained.
Need and Deprivation Indices
Many previous studies on health financing in South Africa have
relied on equal funding per capita as a basis of measuring
equity (see for example McIntyre, Baba and Makan, 1998).
While this is one approach it may not go far enough. Instead,
equitable funding may require a bias toward those in greatest
need or the endorsement of the notion of vertical equity,
“unequal treatment of unequals” (Mooney, 1996; McIntyre,
1997). Therefore, to assist with measuring equity, composite indices of deprivation for district
municipalities were constructed from 1996 census data. In this report both funding per capita
and funding according to deprivation are explored as measures of equity.2
Census data for 1996 were utilised to build up a picture of need for health care services in
each district. Data from the ward level were used in relation to variables that appeared
relevant to socio-economic status. These are shown below in Box 1.1.  The values of such
indicators were weighted according to the respective population within each ward. A
deprivation index score was calculated using principal component analysis.
Box 1.1
Case Study Sites
In each case study site a review of resource allocation processes and their impact on intra-
district equity was conducted. The sites were chosen to reflect an appropriate urban-rural
balance while also considering size of local government area and number of sub-districts. The
case study sites chosen were Thabo Mofutsanyane District, Tshwane Metropolitan Area and
Alfred Nzo District.
                                                
2 It may be argued that sectors, other than health, also contribute to health status and the need for
health care. While the authors accept this point an analysis of broader social sector spending goes
beyond the scope of this research project. It is, nevertheless, an important area for future research.
Key Socio-Economic Variables
• Proportion of black individuals in the population
• Proportion of children in the population
• Proportion of the population which is illiterate
• Proportion of the population which is unemployed
• Proportion of the population living in informal dwellings
• Proportion of the population with no access to telephones
• Proportion of the population with no electricity
• Proportion of the population with no sanitation
• Proportion of the population with no direct access to water
Equitable funding may
require a bias toward
those in greatest need
“unequal treatment of
unequals”.
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Results
Overall Financing
Almost R 5.8 billion was spent on non-hospital PHC in 2001/02 (see Graph 1.1). This is
approximately 19% of the public sector health budget. To compare these estimates of PHC
expenditure with earlier years, National Health Accounts data (Thomas and Muirhead, 2000)
are analysed for 1996/97-1998/99. Transforming all data into 2001/02 prices gives Diagram
3.1, which shows that real expenditure peaked in 1997/98, just under R6.0 billion or R176 per
capita. Since then spending on PHC has dropped both in real and per capita terms. There
was a fiscal squeeze in 1998/99 which impacted on all public health sector budgeting.
Further, it is also argued that some of the increases in the mid 1990s were related to high
medical inflation and increased staff costs (Blecher and Thomas, 2003) and thus exaggerates
increases in the quality and quantity of PHC service provision. Nevertheless, there was
definitely a recovery in funding from 1998/99. However, real per capita expenditure on non-
hospital PHC in 2001/02 was still lower than in 1996/97.
Further, the average amount spent on PHC per person is lower than required for the PHC
package, over R200 per capita in 2001/02 prices – but there are some indications that PHC
per capita funding levels have improved since 2001/02, albeit insufficiently to fund required
services.
Graph 1.1: Total and per capita funding of non-hospital PHC in the public sector,
1996/97-2001/02 (at 2001/02 prices)
Financing and Equity
Summary results are highlighted in Graph 1.2. Here the
financing per capita of non-hospital PHC services in each
health district is compared with the need in each district,
calculated using deprivation indices. Financing per capita
ranges from a high of R300 to well under R50, and is
shown by the curve from top left to bottom right. For each
district, the deprivation score is also shown, ranging from
+6 to almost –8. A trend line has been added to the
deprivation scores to make the relationship clearer
between financing and need. As can be seen, as financing
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per capita decreases there is an overall trend for the district to have a higher deprivation
score. In other words the most needy districts get the least funding and vice versa.
Graph 1.2: Financing per capita vs. Deprivation across health districts in South Africa
KEY: DIS is the deprivation index score and Linear (DIS) is a linear trend line for the DIS.
This general picture of an inverse relationship between need and financing is also highlighted
in Table 1.1. However, this time the data refer to relative deprivation within each province.
This means that the scores cannot be compared across provinces. Instead they indicate
within any province the deprivation of a district relative to the other districts in that province.
For instance, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Area has a very low deprivation score in Table
1.1. This indicates that compared to other districts in the Eastern Cape it is relatively affluent.
As can be seen in Table 1.1, it is generally the case that the best funded districts, in per
capita terms, are not those which are deprived. Conversely those districts that receive the
least funding per capita tend to be those with high deprivation scores.3
                                                
3 The socio-economic indicators used in calculating the deprivation index, shown in Box 1.1, indicate
that there is unlikely to be any tangible impact of health funding on deprivation.
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Table 1.1: Best and worst funded district municipalities, in per capita terms,
with their deprivation scores
Best-Funded Districts Worst-Funded Districts
District Deprivation IndexScore District
Deprivation Index
Score
Eastern Cape
Nelson Mandela (PE) -1.54 DC 14 0.21
DC 12 -0.12 DC 10 -0.95
Free State
DC 16 -0.15 DC 19 0.51
DC 17 -0.31 DC 20 -0.18
Gauteng
Ekurhuleni (ER) -0.13 CBDC2 0.73
Egoli (Jbg) -0.28 CBDC8 0.26
Limpopo
DC 33 -0.47 DC 35 0.28
DC 36 -0.44 CBDC4 0.25
KZN
Durban Metro -0.97 DC24 0.67
DC 22 -0.37 DC 29 0.37
Mpumalanga
DC 32 0.26 DC 30 -0.21
Northern Cape
CBDC1 -0.42 DC 8 0.1
North West
DC 39 0.49 CBDC1 0.72
DC 40 -0.96 DC37 -0.13
Western Cape
Cape Town -0.61 DC2 0.09
DC5 0.35 DC3 0.45
Note:
Higher positive values indicate increased relative deprivation within a specific province.
Comparisons cannot be made across provinces as the data are relative to each province.
Implications of the narrow definition of Municipal Health Services
The issue of how to finance PHC is particularly pertinent given
the minimalist definition of Municipal Health Services contained
in the National Health Bill. The definition basically gives district
municipalities the responsibility for financing and providing
Environmental Health Services only. The remainder of PHC
services must be funded from Provincial Departments of
Health. The implications of this definition are unclear at
present. The worst case scenario from a sustainability
perspective is that there will be a loss of funding for PHC of
about R 1.0 billion, minus the costs of provision of
Environmental Health Services - at maximum an 18% reduction in total public sector PHC
financing. Key concerns relate to the responsibility for funding this potential short-fall.
Nevertheless, others argue that the loss of funding may not be of too much concern. From an
equity perspective they claim that the biggest loss of funding will actually occur in those
districts where local government own revenue is high. It may be argued that such districts are
those that are well off anyway and are currently “overfunded”. Taking this one step further,
those who support a more equitable allocation of resources might argue that the removal of
local government PHC funding might actually level the playing field between districts and
reduce inequities.
The issue of how to
finance PHC is
particularly pertinent
given the minimalist
definition of Municipal
Health Services
contained in the
National Health Bill.
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To explore such issues it is worth re-examining the data to see whether such assertions have
any validity. In particular it is useful to examine those health districts where:
• Own revenue is a high share of total PHC expenditure
• Funding appears to be far below that required to deliver a PHC package.
In essence this analysis examines issues around both sustainability and equity. It
concentrates on the districts that appear underfunded yet also rely on own revenue funding.
More precisely, our analysis explores those health districts where overall funding per capita of
PHC is less than R100 per capita and between R100 and R120 per capita and where own
revenue funding is important for PHC funding.
Several points arise from this analysis. First, there are a number of health districts where PHC
is currently extremely underfunded in per capita terms where local government own financing
is important. Hence, it is not just the well-funded health districts that will be hit by this
redefinition.
DC30 and DC31 in Mpumalanga appear extremely vulnerable to loss of own revenue, with
already low PHC funding per capita. In such cases, the amounts lost may not be large in
Rand terms but the impact could be huge in terms of service delivery.
Interestingly, to fill the potential gap lost by the twelve health districts with less than R100 pc
of PHC funding, which would be most affected by the definition, less than R100 million would
be needed. For the fourteen health districts where PHC per capita funding is between R100
and R120, Table 1.1 shows that an extra R175 million would need to be raised to bridge the
gap. In this latter grouping are the two metropolitan councils which appear most vulnerable to
loss of own revenue funding, Tshwane and Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth). Consequently,
the data imply that at least R275 million should be targeted to these 26 health districts to
avoid serious impacts on health care service delivery in already under-funded contexts. Still
such a strategy should be seen as merely disaster avoidance. The pervasive inequities in the
system highlighted earlier in the chapter and the need to deliver a full PHC package in all
health districts require further and more comprehensive action.
Key Findings from the Case Studies of Resource Allocation within Districts
Actors and their power in budgeting
Provincial institutions, such as the Department of
Health and Treasury, are very powerful in the decision-
making processes around how resources are allocated
to and even within districts. The degree of
decentralisation of finances to district municipalities and
below is very limited, though the extent differs from
province to province. Nevertheless, where there is a
functional IDP process, local level politicians (and particularly District Mayoral Committees)
can make a substantial difference in how capital funding of health care is allocated.
Parallel Budget Processes
It appears there are two distinct and parallel processes
for budget formulation. It is not apparent, though, how
these resource allocation systems interact. One, the
PDoH allocation of resources, is steered by provincial
authorities, relates to health operational/recurrent
funding and is quite top-down.
The other, the IDP, is directed by local politicians, makes decisions primarily on capital
funding, is multi-sectoral in nature and is bottom-up (in that it consults with communities and
attempts to identify their needs). Further, each budgeting cycle is out of line with the other –
A lack of interaction
between the two budgeting
systems may produce
inefficiencies and result in a
squandering of scarce
resources.
The degree of
decentralisation of finances
to district municipalities and
below is very limited, though
the extent differs from
province to province.
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financial years do not concur. Nevertheless, the decisions that are taken within each
budgeting process will impact on the other. New capital projects will have recurrent cost
implications. If these are not factored in to future budgets, then facilities risk being under-
maintained and inappropriately staffed. A lack of interaction between the two budgeting
systems may produce inefficiencies and result in a squandering of scarce resources.
Incremental Approaches
Across all case studies it was admitted that historical incremental budgeting was used far
more than it should have been. Nevertheless, such a system perpetuates inequities and
consolidates inefficiencies. Further, there is sometimes the confusion that needs-based
resource allocation should be related to demand or utilisation of services. Nevertheless, the
international literature shows that utilisation based funding does not adequately address
need. Indeed this approach may well guarantee significant underfunding in needy areas,
especially as low demand may well be a product of low quality caused by previous
underfunding. Relatedly the interviews revealed that some Treasuries are keen to relate
funding to perceived capacity to benefit, without attempting to improve the capacity to benefit
of deprived areas. Distribution of resources by such criteria will only compound inequities in
resource allocation.
Resource Allocation Criteria
In all the case study areas there were discussions
that budgets should, take into account population
bases and might also consider income and disease
types (particularly HIV/AIDS). However, one province
that pursued a formula for promoting a more equitable
resource allocation across geographic areas met with
opposition from stakeholders and the process has
now been shelved. Problems may further be
compounded by limited financial management and
strategic planning capacity in some districts fuelling concerns about their “capacity to benefit”.
Effective communication and clear roles
Communication between stakeholders proved to be essential for effective budgeting at all
levels and particularly between provinces and districts, districts and sub-districts and districts
and local governments. With the evolution of parallel budgeting processes this communication
and exchange will become increasingly important. Finally, roles and responsibilities in
budgeting were often reported to be unclear – particularly between district and sub-districts
and also between regions, where they still exist.
Problems may further be
compounded by limited
financial management and
strategic planning capacity in
some districts fuelling
concerns about their “capacity
to benefit”.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The results produced by these studies highlight the extent of inequities in health financing of
non-hospital PHC across South Africa. In many ways they confirm the international picture
that uncorrected decentralisation of health financing is no recipe for equity.
• The financing of PHC is fragmented and there is no evidence of its coordination
within the decentralisation process. Currently, no single institution has the
mandate or authority for this role. Further, there has been no explicit national
policy for PHC financing. Consequently, resource allocation for non-hospital PHC
has been done with virtually no regard for equity.
• Need for health care and financial resources for PHC are inversely related. The
least deprived health districts tend to get the most funds per person. Such results
hold not only across the country as a whole but within most provinces.
• There are wide discrepancies in per capita financing of non-hospital PHC across
provinces and districts. Four times as much money per person is allocated for
these activities in the Western Cape as in Mpumalanga. Funding to individual
health districts ranges from R300 to under R40 per capita. Indeed, 19 district
municipalities receive less than R100 per capita for financing non-hospital PHC
activities. Such amounts are far below those needed to deliver a PHC package.
• Relatedly, financial resources are highly concentrated in certain provinces and
health districts; 3 provinces account for 60% of resources (KwaZulu Natal,
Gauteng and Western Cape), but only 43% of the population, and the five best-
funded health districts claim 43% of all non-hospital PHC funding, with only 28%
of the population.
• The degree of financial decentralisation to local government levels is in most
provinces limited. Provincial Departments of Health are the main funders of non-
hospital PHC, averaging 75% of all finances. In Limpopo and North West around
90% of funds come straight from Provincial Departments of Health.
• Provinces are doing little to address inequities in the financing of PHC across their
health districts. They are not using measures of need to guide budgeting (such as
population based resource allocation). In general, they do not compensate for the
differential revenue raising capacity of different districts and in some cases they
exacerbate inequities.
• The relationship between IDPs and the provincial allocations to the health sector
need to be resolved. Currently, the two processes are working in parallel, which
may result in inefficient and ineffective allocation and utilisation of resources.
• It is clear that historical budgeting processes still determine the allocation of
resources in and across many districts and is recognised as being inefficient and
inequitable.
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Laying the Foundations for Equity
It is vital that the National Department of Health, in alliance with National Treasury and
provinces, develop a PHC financing policy which guarantees equitable financing to support
access to an agreed package of services. In this regard, research is needed to ascertain the
actual costs of PHC service delivery in provinces, the quality and quantity of services
provided and the additional financing requirements for delivery of a PHC package. Broad-
based commitment to the provision of the PHC package is foundational for equitable financing
of PHC.
While an appropriate understanding of the financial requirements for PHC delivery is
important, other steps are also needed to ensure appropriate use of such funds, and these
relate to:
• Improving absorptive capacity of local governments;
• Guaranteeing the efficient use of allocated resources through effective budgeting and
decision-making
• Ensuring effective deployment of human resources to provide PHC services;
• Bolstering PHC capital infrastructure to improve access.
What is clear from the above is that to make redistribution work, to fund PHC more
effectively and meet the needs of the population, substantially greater resources must
be allocated to developing the decentralised health care system. A platform is needed
for effective redistribution. Resources and strategies must be directed to this end to
allow an equitable PHC system to emerge.
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Chapter 2
Transport - an Essential Resource for Health Services4
Wendy Hall
Health Systems Trust
Background
Equitable distribution of all resources for delivery of health services between and within health
districts is required to achieve the Constitutional vision of universal access to health care. The
challenges of equitable redistribution of financial resources are discussed in Chapter 1. There
are, however, other essential resources for health services delivery, such as transport, that
may require redistribution.  Transport-related research, focusing on two main issues, was
undertaken between April and June 2002.  It aimed to understand, firstly, the present system
of distributing transport for health services and, secondly, some of the challenges that health
officials face in ensuring that transport is available for delivery of health services. Policy and
other documents were reviewed, key informants were interviewed and discussions held with
health service providers in three provinces, Gauteng, Limpopo and Mpumalanga.
This chapter provides an overview of the current systems for providing transport for public
sector health services. These systems, together with the National Department of Transport’s
2002/2003 strategic plans for managing the national government’s motor fleet, and their
possible implications for service delivery are discussed. Recommendations for further
research and for improving transport for health services, based on experiences in other
developing countries, are made.
                                                
The full report on this research, of which the chapter is a summary, can be downloaded in pdf format
from www.hst.org.za
Hall, W. du Plessis, D. and D. McCoy D.  Transport for Health Care Delivery. In:  South African Health
Review 2000. Durban: Health Systems Trust; 2002.
URL: ftp://ftp.hst.org.za/pubs/sahr/2002/chapter18.pdf
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Current Transport Systems for Public Health Service Delivery
Provision of transport for service delivery is dependent on complex inter-government and
inter-sectoral linkages. Policies and management systems for the national government motor
fleet for all sectors within national and provincial spheres of government are centrally
determined and controlled by the National Department of Transport. These policies and
systems do not apply to services delivered by the local sphere of government - i.e. the
metropolitan areas, district municipalities and local municipalities.
Table 2.1 lists the stakeholders and some of their roles and functions in the provision of
transport for health.
Transport is essential for health services delivery.
It is required for
• Delivery of health services – mobile services, supervision visits to
clinics and communities, school health services, support of DOTS
and other community based health programmes
• Patient transfers – elective and emergency
• Support services – collection and delivery of supplies and drugs,
general administration, attending meetings.
Development of policies and management systems for
transport for provincial health services are centralised
in the National Department of Transport.
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Table 2.1: Stakeholders and their roles in transport for public sector health
services
Stakeholder Roles and Functions
National Dept of
Transport
(NDoT)
Sets policy for all national and provincial government sectors.
Transport for service delivery controlled and monitored by
Government Motor Transport, Subdivision of Corporate Services
Division.
NDoT Strategic Plan 2002/2003 states for management of national
fleet includes: -
? Implementation of private-public partnerships
? Improved reliability and availability of subsidised transport
Monitoring of above strategies.
Contracted Wesbank First Auto (RT460) as Fleet Management
Service Provider.
Negotiate Tender RT77 for purchase of new vehicles for all
provincial and national departments.N
A
TI
O
N
A
L 
SP
H
ER
E
National Dept of Health
(NDoH)
No role for provision of transport at service delivery level.
Provincial Dept of
Transport
(PDoT)
Implement national policy.
Establish Motor Transport Advisory Committees – includes all
provincial departments.
Management of provincial fleet – purchase, licencing, repair and
disposal – supported by Wesbank First Auto.
Managing and monitoring PPPs in the province.
PR
O
VI
N
C
IA
L 
SP
H
ER
E
Provincial Dept of Health
(PDoH)
Hire of vehicles for health services from PDoT.
Liaise with PDoT and Wesbank First Auto in fleet management.
Allocation of vehicles to health regions, districts and sub-districts
for service delivery.
Financial accountability for transport – PFMA requirements.
LO
C
A
L 
SP
H
ER
E
Local Government
(LG)
Provision of transport for health within own area of jurisdiction –
metro, district or local municipality who provide: -
? Finance for purchase and maintenance of vehicles
? Monitoring of the fleet
? Allocation to services
Local policies, not subject to NDoT policies.
The role of the National Sphere of Government
The National Department of Transport (NDoT) determines policy and monitors
implementation of these policies. Government Motor Transport, a subdivision of the Corporate
Service Division, is responsible for transport in all government sectors within the national and
provincial spheres. This department is required to “manage the national government’s motor
fleet”, through strategies that ensure “an effective fleet management system with effective
controls; (and) reduces fleet management costs” (NDoT 2002/3 Strategic Plan).
SE
R
VI
C
E
D
EL
IV
ER
Y
Health Region / District
/ Sub-district
Day to day management of vehicles allocated by PDoH.
Allocation of vehicles for health delivery functions.
Motivate to PDoH for vehicles for service delivery.
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The NDoT has contracts for the purchase of new and replacement vehicles (Tender RT 77)
and for a Fleet Management Service Provider (Tender RT 460). These tenders apply across
all sectors in national and provincial government services.
The NDoT and the Provincial Departments of Transport (PDoT) purchase new vehicles
through Tender RT 77 at reasonable prices from many manufacturers. Tender RT460 (Fleet
Management Service Provider) is presently held by Wesbank First Auto. In terms of this
tender First Auto is responsible for the monitoring and control of all government owned
vehicles, which includes facilitating the repair and maintenance of the vehicles and providing
a fuel tagging system to reduce fuel fraud. First Auto liases with the NDoT and the PDoT and
provides them with electronic data on all vehicles in the fleet. Until recently there has been
little or no contact between First Auto and the user departments, such as the Provincial
Department of Health (PDoH), to assist with the management of their vehicles.
The National Department of Health has no role in allocating vehicles for health service
delivery within the provinces.
The role of the Provincial Sphere of Government
Implementation of the NDoT policies is through the PDoT, who liase with the other provincial
departments in supplying the required vehicles for service delivery. Coordination is through
Motor Transport Advisory Committees, established according to the NDoT Transport Policy
(Transport Circular No 4 of 2000). All provincial government sector departments, including the
PDoH, are represented in this committee.
The PDoH is financially accountable, in terms of the Public Finance Management Act
(PFMA), for the cost of transport used for delivery of health services. However, the PDoH is
dependent on the PDoT to supply these vehicles (for which a hire fee is paid) and to
coordinate licensing and repair and maintenance of the vehicles. New and replacement
vehicles are purchased through the NDoT tender, RT 77. The PDoH may request specific
vehicle models for service delivery, but the final decision for purchase of vehicles rests with
the PDoT.  The Provincial Department of Finance (PDoF) must confirm that funds are
available for purchase, maintenance and repair of vehicles.
The health districts/sub-districts and health facilities are allocated vehicles by the PDoH for
service delivery. Problems with availability of vehicles for service delivery are common,
particularly in the more rural provinces of Limpopo and Mpumalanga.
In the three provinces in the study, the PDoT was found to be working closely with their user
departments. Strategies to streamline the provision of transport for service delivery, including
delegation of some of the PDoT functions to the user departments, are under discussion.
The role of the Local Sphere of Government
The NDoT policies do not apply within the local government sphere of government. The
metros, district and local municipal councils determine their own policies and allocate
transport for all services within their area of jurisdiction. The metropolitan areas and the larger
local municipalities may have vehicles that are dedicated to health services, whereas in the
smaller local municipalities vehicles are often pooled and shared between departments.
Local government presently has limited health responsibilities (environmental health and
some primary health care services) and thus does not need as many vehicles for service
delivery as is required by the health districts administered by the PDoH.  Local government
will need to increase the size of their fleet if more PHC services are decentralised to local
government.
During the time of this research, local government health workers reported that they
experienced very few problems with the availability and management of transport for health
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service delivery. As noted above, the area of jurisdiction for local government is smaller than
the provincial, and is often confined to a single local or metropolitan municipality.
Implications for Health Districts and Sub-districts
A complex relationship exists between the spheres of government (National and Provincial),
sectors (transport, health and finance) and private sector (First Auto for fleet service
management) in providing transport for health service delivery. The health service providers
in the health districts and sub-districts rely on this complex system to work efficiently to
ensure that there are adequate vehicles available for service delivery.
However, the reality often reflects a picture of inefficiency. There is a commonly heard cry
from health workers in the provincially-run health services, that there is a lack of transport for
timeous transfer of patients between levels of health care, for supervision and support of
health workers and for the delivery of medicines, vaccines and other essential supplies to
clinics. This is particularly true in the rural areas of the country. Problems with transport have
been identified as a direct, avoidable cause of death in peri-natal and maternal death surveys.
For example, the annual peri-natal care surveys in 2000 and 2001 identified problems with
transport as a direct, avoidable cause of peri-natal deaths (2.6% in 2000 and 5.3% in 2001)
(Medical Research Council, 2001) while lack of transport for moving patients between
institutions accounted for 13.6% of maternal deaths reported in 1998 (Pattinson, B, 1998).
Reports of vehicles lying idle for extended periods of time or being without licences are not
uncommon. Authority to issue new licences and for vehicle repairs to be carried out is
required from both the PDoH and the PDoT.  The Provincial Department of Finance (PDoF)
must also confirm that funds are available. Time delays are experienced with the information
being fed up and down the system. First Auto, as fleet service managers, does facilitate the
process and improvements in some areas were reported. The planned decentralisation of
some PDoT functions to the PDoH is designed to improve the current management system
and will potentially decrease the delays being experienced in replacing, maintaining or
repairing the current fleet of vehicles in the health services. However, it remains difficult for
this protracted vertical system to respond timeously to the transport needs of the health
workers in the health districts and sub-districts.
National Department of Transport Strategies
The management of the national government fleet, through the National Department of
Transport’s Strategic Plan for 2002/2003, includes strategies for:
• implementation of PPPs (private-public partnerships) where appropriate; and
• improved reliability and availability of subsidised transport.
Management of the national government fleet is not considered to be a core function of the
NDoT and the strategy of privatising is therefore in line with the general government policy of
outsourcing non-core functions. These policies are: -
• Subsidised car scheme (National Department of Transport Circular No 4 of
2001)
This is a scheme through which an official in the department purchases with a
subsidy a vehicle for his/her official duties, thus supplementing the pool of vehicles
available for service delivery. The department reimburses the official for work-related
trips and at the end of the contract period the vehicle becomes the property of the
official. To participate in the scheme the official must meet certain prescribed criteria
that include requiring the vehicle as a work facility, traveling more than a prescribed
distance each month and satisfying Wesbank’s (the present private financial service
provider) financing requirements. All applications to join the scheme are signed by the
head of department and the NDoT monitors the scheme.
• Outsourcing
The NDoT’s policy, as stated in the strategic plans for 2002- 2003, is to outsource
fleet management for all government departments through public-private partnerships
(PPP) with companies whose core business is fleet management. The private
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company is then responsible for managing the government fleet and ensuring that
vehicles are available at all times for service delivery. The National Treasury’s Public
Private Partnership Departmental Guidelines guide the process of setting up these
PPPs.
These two policy approaches are designed to improve the efficiency of the management of
the fleet and to improve the availability of transport for service delivery within all sectors.
Theoretically they achieve this. In the subsidised car scheme the individual ensures that the
vehicle is available for official use and may not use a government-owned vehicle. The
scheme does potentially increase the availability of transport for carrying out official functions,
but it requires good management to ensure that the criteria are adhered to and that the
vehicles are only used for service delivery. The scheme is open to abuse. Fleet management
for all national departments was outsourced in 1999 to Imperial Holdings (Press release,
National Minister for Transport, 10 June 1999) and the entire Northern Cape government fleet
is now managed through a PPP signed in November 2001 with Pemberley Investments (Pty)
Ltd, comprising of Africa Kosini; Imperial Holdings (NDoT, 2002). Other outsourcing projects
are planned.
Three questions arise:
? What is the impact of outsourcing transport management and extending the
subsidised car scheme on health service delivery? Are the policies, which might be
good for some sectors, actually impeding health service delivery?
? How will these policies operate in a decentralised health system in which local
government is not subject to national transport policies?
? How can the equitable distribution of transport for health service delivery be assured
in a decentralised system?
Discussion
Lack of transport for health service delivery is not unique to South Africa - neither is the policy
of decentralising health services to a local level, establishing the DHS and using the PHC
approach. There is international experience and research that can be drawn on to assist with
establishing a transport system that can respond to the needs of the health services.
There is no proof that either of these policies - outsourcing or subsidised
car scheme -  improve the delivery of health services. The impact on
service delivery has simply not been investigated. The schemes are
centrally developed and monitored and vertically implemented.
TransAid Worldwide, an international Non Government Organisation (NGO), has been
training transport managers in South Africa at all levels of the health system since 1996.
The organisation has also undertaken a multi-country study on transport management in
the health sector in four sub-Saharan countries – Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire, South Africa and
Zimbabwe. This study demonstrated the importance of a functional transport system that
includes policy, operational management, fleet management and management information
supported by a comprehensive situation analysis and good human resources for ensuring
the effective and efficient delivery of health services (Nancollas, S, 2001). This study
showed that in Ghana the Ministry of Health has taken full responsibility for a transport
system for health services. This move had a positive impact on availability of transport for
service delivery. Ghana has a decentralised health system with districts and regions having
budget responsibilities and the country scored the highest Transport-management Profile in
this report. The report recommends that in South Africa the Department of Health should
manage the health fleet in-house, as it does not get value for money from its relationship
with the Department of Transport.
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There is some evidence that a locally managed, comprehensive transport system is very
efficient and effective in ensuring transport availability for health service delivery in a
decentralised health system. Currently transport for provincial health services is centrally
controlled and managed through a vertical system that is dependent on complex
intergovernmental relationships requiring good inter-sectoral collaboration at all levels of the
system. A major concern is that new policies developed by the NDoT focus on the needs of
government as a whole, and not necessarily on the needs of the service providers. In reality,
lack of transport for service delivery is a common complaint at all levels of the service as the
system is difficult to manage efficiently.
Conversely, policies for provision of transport for health services within the local sphere of
government are locally determined, managed and controlled. There are few complaints from
health workers in local government.
Recommendations
South Africa is moving towards a decentralised form of government through establishing
an effective and efficient local sphere of government. The vision for health services is a
municipal based DHS. Equitably distributed and efficiently managed support services
that are responsive to local needs are required. Transport is a vital support service for
health services.
1. Undertake research to answer three  pertinent questions:
? What is the impact of outsourcing transport management and increasing the
extension of the subsidised car scheme on health service delivery? Are the
policies, which might be good for some sectors, actually impeding health service
delivery?
? How will these policies operate in a decentralised health system in which local
government is not subject to national policies for transport?
? How can the equitable distribution of transport for health service delivery be
assured in a decentralised system?
2. The national and provincial departments of health should take full responsibility for
the provision of transport for health services. Policies need to be developed
independent of the Department of Transport.
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Chapter 3
Governmental Relations and HIV Service Delivery5
Duane Blaauw, Lucy Gilson, Precious Modiba,
 Ermin Erasmus, Gugu Khumalo, Helen Schneider
Centre for Health Policy
Background
This chapter reports on some of the main findings of a research project that examined inter-
governmental relations in the health sector in South Africa (Blaauw et.al., 2003) The study
focused on HIV/AIDS services with the intention of using HIV/AIDS as a tracer or probe of
broader health system functioning. The main objectives of the research were to describe what
HIV/AIDS services are provided, how the different functions are allocated between
government actors, and how they are then coordinated.
Phase 1 was completed in the second half of 2002 and provided a broad National Overview
of HIV/AIDS activities in the national, provincial and local spheres of government. Phase 2
was done in early 2003 and consisted of detailed Case Studies from three different study
sites. The research methodology was mainly qualitative and exploratory and included
literature review, document analysis and key informant interviews.
The key results of the project are presented by considering the following questions:
1. Why is coordination important in decentralisation reform?
2. How do we describe inter- and intra-governmental relations?
3. How are HIV/AIDS roles and responsibilities allocated?
4. How are HIV/AIDS services coordinated?
5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current arrangements?
6. What contextual factors influence these relationships?
7. What is the impact on HIV/AIDS service delivery?
8. How can governmental coordination be improved?
                                                
The full report on this research, of which the chapter is a summary, can be downloaded in pdf format
from www.hst.org.za or from  www.wits.ac.za/chp/
Blaauw D, Gilson L, Modiba P, Erasmus E, Khumalo G and Schneider H. (2004).  Governmental
Relationships and HIV/AIDS Service Delivery.  The Local Government and Health Consortium, Health
Systems Trust, Durban. 2003
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1 Why Is Coordination Important In Decentralisation
Reform?
Health sector decentralisation involves a shifting of
power between central and peripheral levels (Mills,
1994). As authority is transferred from the centre
towards the periphery, roles and responsibilities of
each level of the system have to be re-aligned. The
wider distribution of responsibility requires new
mechanisms of coordination to ensure that all levels
work together coherently to support service delivery
and enable health system goals to be achieved.
International experience indicates that a common problem of decentralisation reform is that
the roles of the different levels may not be clearly or appropriately re-defined (Thomason et
al., 1991). For example, within a decentralised system the central level should retain functions
related to setting national frameworks but give up responsibility for translating these policies
into service delivery. The central level also needs to change from a command style of
management to a more facilitatory approach. However, the central level often fails to adapt to
these new roles. By retaining too much authority the central level can undermine the
attainment of decentralisation reform objectives (Mercado et al., 1996). On the other hand, if
too much authority is transferred to the periphery, national goals of equity and coherence may
be undermined (Collins and Green, 1994).
The fragmentation of responsibilities and authorities that results from health decentralisation
are cited frequently (Kohlemainen-Aitken and Newbrander, 1997). How to address the
problem and how to improve integration and coordination has, however, received much less
attention in the health systems literature. One of the main objectives of this study was,
therefore, to explore in more detail how activities are coordinated between different
government actors within decentralising health systems such as South Africa.
Health sector decentralisation is not simply a technical exercise in organisational design.
Socio-cultural factors such as the local socio-political context, organisational culture, and
informal organisational relationships have been shown to have a significant influence on the
impact of health decentralisation reforms (Atkinson et al., 2000).
2 How Do We Describe Governmental Relations?
Governmental relationships are extremely complex. It is difficult to talk about governmental
coordination without developing some conceptual frameworks and definitions. One of the
frameworks developed in this study is presented in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 firstly summarises the key actors involved in HIV service provision. According to
the Constitution, the government is divided into national, provincial and local spheres as well
as the legislative, executive and administrative arms. Each of these divisions has some
responsibility in relation to health system functioning. Of course, health functions are mainly
allocated to the Health Departments at the national, provincial and local levels. Within the
Departments of Health (DoH), both national and provincial HIV/AIDS directorates or units are
primarily responsible for the provision of HIV services but have to work together with other
health programmes, support staff and line managers in order to be effective. Figure 3.1 also
highlights the important role of civil society and the private sector in HIV/AIDS and reminds us
that the provincial sphere actually consists of nine different provinces and that the local
sphere is made up of 6 metropolitan municipalities, 47 district municipalities and 231 local
municipalities.
Within a decentralised system
the central level should retain
functions related to setting
national frameworks but give
up responsibility for
translating these policies into
service delivery.
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Figure 3.1: Framework for describing the main actors and main categories of coordination in HIV services
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Coordination relationships are multi-faceted and can be described and categorised in a number of
different ways. Some of the terminology used in this study is summarised in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Different ways of describing governmental coordination relationships
Characteristic Description Main Sub-Categories
Dimension Whether relationship is at same
level or between levels
• Horizontal
• Vertical
Domain Whether relationship is within
government or with actors outside
of government
• Internal
• External
Category Main categories of governmental
relationships on the basis of
which actors are involved
• Inter-governmental
• Inter-sectoral
• Inter-provincial
• Inter-municipal
• Political-
administrative
• Inter-departmental
• Intra-departmental
• Referrals
Mechanism Means of coordination • Coordination
structures
• Planning
• Meetings
• Informal relationships
Channel Which part of government is
involved
• Legislative
• Executive / Political
• Administrative
Nature Nature of the relationship • No relationship
• Information sharing
• Consultation
• Accommodation
• Joint decision-making
3 How Are HIV/AIDS Roles And Responsibilities Allocated?
The Constitution allocates health responsibilities to all three spheres of government: general health
services are shared between the national and provincial spheres, provinces are exclusively responsible
for ambulance health services, and the local sphere is made responsible for municipal health services
(MHS), but without defining what this might be. Although national policy is committed to the
development of a municipal-based District Health System (DHS), the Health White Paper and earlier
drafts of the National Health Bill focus on the functions of the national, provincial and district levels but
are not clear on how this relates to local government. A decision of the Health MinMEC6 in early 2001
suggested that the local sphere would ultimately be responsible for district governance and defined
MHS as primary health care, implying a significant role for local government in the provision of
HIV/AIDS services.  In the final version of the National Health Bill submitted to parliament in September
2003 provides a definition for MHS which effectively reduces local government’s direct health
responsibility to a list of environmental health services. The Bill does, however, make provision for
additional health functions to be delegated to competent municipalities.
The HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan is the most important blueprint for the government’s HIV/AIDS strategy. It
outlines a comprehensive package of interventions but is less clear on how the different responsibilities
will be allocated and coordinated. The Plan is mainly concerned with involving other departments and
sectors in the campaign against HIV/AIDS, and makes almost no mention of the different spheres of
government.  There was reasonable consensus among the respondents in this study about the roles of
the different actors in relation to the HIV/AIDS programme. These are summarised in Table 3.2.
                                                
6 Meeting of the National Minister for Health with the Provincial Members of the Executive Council (MEC)
responsible for health in each province.
Both national and provincial respondents said that the main role
of the Provincial Department of Health (PDoH) was to modify
national policies according to provincial realities.
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Table 3.2: Identified roles and responsibilities of key Actors
National DoH Provincial DoH Local Government DoH
• Implementation
• Clinic services
• Prevention
• Serve as channel to communities
• Integrate local level resources
• NGOs
• CBOs
• Infrastructure
• Poverty alleviation
• Adapt national policies programmes to provincial
circumstances
• Develop plans to operationalise policies and strategies
• Provide appropriate environment for implementation
• Training
• Capacity development
• Mobilise resources at provincial level
• Allocate provincial resources
• Hospital services
• Establish and support inter-governmental coordination
structures
• Serve as channel to district, local government
• Feed local dynamics up to national
• Monitoring and evaluation of implementation
• Leadership
• Provide strategic direction
• Policy development
• Define norms & standards
• Develop guidelines & protocols
• Provide technical support to provinces
• Training
• Mobilise resources
• Allocate resources
• Provide resources for national programmes
(conditional grants)
• Funding of NGOs
• Monitoring & evaluation
• Coordination
• International liaison
• Research
Hospitals Clinics NGOs Other Government Departments
• Treatment of opportunistic
infections
• Providing post-exposure
prophylaxis (PEP)
• Providing palliative care in step-
down facilities
• IEC and AIDS awareness
• Treatment of opportunistic
infections
• Treating STIs
• Providing VCT services
• Linking with and supporting NGOs
• IEC, campaigns
• Condom distribution
• Counselling
• VCT
• HBC services
• AIDS orphans
• Counsellors, carers
• Other NGOs
• Health workers
Social Development
• Social grants
• Poverty alleviation
• AIDS orphans
• NGO support
Education
• Health education
• Life skills training
National Treasury
• Resource allocation
• Conditional grants
Public Service Administration
• Government workplace HIV programmes
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The National Department of Health (NDoH) was seen to have a legitimate role in steering the
HIV/AIDS programme. Both national and provincial respondents said that the main role of the
Provincial DoH (PDoH) was to modify national policies according to provincial realities. Local
government informants mentioned their role in the provision of clinic services, advocacy,
training, home-base care (HBC), and NGO support. Hospitals and clinics were described as
being responsible for clinical service provision, particularly the treatment of STDs and
opportunistic infections. NGOs were mentioned as legitimate and important HIV/AIDS actors,
particularly in the provision of home-base care (HBC) for AIDS patients, but also for
education, counselling and training.
4 How Are HIV/AIDS Services Coordinated?
The Constitution provides the broad legislative framework for inter-governmental relations and
outlines a system of co-operative governance in which shared objectives and values are most
important in coordinating relations between the three spheres. The Local Government White
Paper and subsequent legislation also emphasise the need for cooperative inter-
governmental relations and further suggest that local government can play an important role,
particularly through the development of local Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).
Table 3.3: Main coordination mechanisms by category of coordination
Category of Coordination Coordination Mechanisms
National – Provincial • General structures: MinMEC, PHRC
• National HIV meetings
• National programme meetings
• Consultation in policy development
• Planning and budgeting processes
• Conditional grants
• Appointment of national staff to provincial level
• HIV newsletter
• Standardised guidelines, manuals
• National reporting mechanisms
National – Local • Very limited engagement
• General structures: (South African Local Government Association) SALGA
reps on MinMEC & Provincial Health Restructuring Committee (PHRC)
Inter-
governmental
Provincial – Local • Mostly ad-hoc and informal
• General structures: Provincial Health Authority (PHA)
• Planning processes: Participation in IDP development
Inter-departmental • General structures: Cabinet, Executive councils, cluster committees
• Dedicated coordination units
• HIV-specific structures: IMCs and IDCs at national and provincial levels
Inter-sectoral • HIV-specific structures: South African National Aids Council (SANAC),
Provincial AIDS Councils (PACs), District Aids Councils (DACs)
• Dedicated coordination units
• Contracts with NGOs
• NGO forums, consortia
Inter-provincial • General structures: MinMEC, PHRC
Inter-municipal • General structures: Provincial Health Authority (PHA), District Health
Authority (DHA)
• HIV-specific structures: PAC, DAC
Intra-departmental • Management meetings
• Direct engagement
Political-Administrative • Direct engagement
• Presentations to legislature
The HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan does not really address
coordination between the three spheres of government.
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The major focus in HIV coordination has been on national-provincial coordination, inter-
departmental coordination and inter-sectoral coordination. National–provincial coordination
has been improved through mechanisms such as the Strategic Plan; regular meetings
between programme directors from the two levels; specific conditional grants to support
priority activities; and the appointment of national personnel at provincial level. A number of
respondents noted that the framework provided by the Strategic Plan had been important in
supporting HIV coordination. As one official noted:
’........ we are guided by the strategic plan. There’s something that gives us the
direction of where we’re going to… there is a sort of continuity, so that you
don’t find every year, you are suddenly doing something totally different, that
there’s some broad framework within which you can operate. And it gives
everyone a sense of where they can slot into the different activities.’ (National
HIV programme official)
Inter-sectoral and inter-departmental coordination have been facilitated by the establishment
of the HIV-specific coordination structures as outlined in the Strategic Plan. Most of these
structures are supported by dedicated personnel and secretariats within the DoH.
Coordination of HIV/AIDS services between provinces and local government has not been
formalised. For example, some interviewees described how they were occasionally involved
in campaigns or projects together, and attended each others’ meetings when invited. Few
respondents spontaneously mentioned broader coordination structures such as the Provincial
Health Authority (PHA). The PHA was generally depicted as a political structure dealing with
tensions related to DHS development and rather removed from day-to-day health service
functioning.
A number of interviewees confirmed the importance of informal relationships as mechanisms
of coordination within the HIV/AIDS programme. As one respondent said:
’Sometimes it works far better to bypass channels and to phone a person
directly and ask them for assistance. That is a very effective manner, although
it’s not always the correct way, but we do get things done in that manner.’
(Provincial official)
5 What Are The Strengths And Weaknesses Of The Current
Arrangements?
Table 3.4. summarises the strengths and weaknesses identified by respondents in relation to
what HIV/AIDS services are provided, how HIV roles and responsibilities functions are
allocated, and how they are coordinated.
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Table 3.4: Summary of strengths and weaknesses
Strengths Weaknesses
HIV/AIDS
Service Package
• Comprehensive outline provided by 5-year
HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan
• Well-defined priority interventions (condom
provision, VCT, HBC)
• Progress with implementation of priority
interventions
• Implementation too slow
• Little on treatment
• Neglect of broader systems and development
roles
Allocation of
Roles and
Responsibilities
• General health roles are defined
• Functions of different actors in relation to
HIV/AIDS has evolved over time
• Reasonable consensus on roles, particularly in
relation to national and provincial levels
• Some attempt to define roles of other
departments and other sectors
• HIV roles and responsibilities of different
actors not formally defined
• Some tensions in role allocation
• Role of local government unclear and unstable
• Limited decentralisation of responsibility
• Focus on directing and controlling rather than
support and development
• Limited attention to service delivery at facilities
Coordination
and Integration
• Coordination of HIV/AIDS services is receiving
attention and resources
• Framework provided by Strategic Plan
• Improvement in National – Provincial
coordination
• Inter-departmental and inter-sectoral
coordination being addressed
• Objectives of coordination not clearly specified
• Weak communication systems
• Poor Provincial – Local coordination
• Less attention to intra-departmental
coordination
• Reliance on structures for coordination
• No coordination of coordination
• Focus mostly on political channels of
coordination
HIV/AIDS Service Package
Most of the officials interviewed were quite positive about the progress that has been made in
the implementation of the HIV programme over the last year or two. They pointed to
improvements in public awareness, condom provision, the expansion of voluntary counselling
and testing (VCT) sites, the introduction of home-based care (HBC), and the strengthening of
sexually transmitted infections (STI) and TB services. A number commented on the
importance of the five-year Strategic Plan in providing a comprehensive and detailed plan of
action.
However, some people felt that progress has been too slow while others argued that curative
services have not had enough attention. Priority activities within the HIV/AIDS programme
have generally become structured into separate, fairly vertical, sub-programmes - such as the
VCT and HBC - with reasonably well-defined packages of interventions. This has facilitated
implementation but has also served to divert attention from broader systems support and
developmental issues. A provincial director explained:
’…. if you look at it now from the Strategy it is only a health issue and yet when
you look at HIV/AIDS it is a developmental issue.’
Allocation of HIV/AIDS Roles and Responsibilities
The HIV Strategic Plan does not clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of the different
spheres and actors with regard to HIV services. A provincial director noted:
‘The HIV Strategic Plan does not clearly specify the roles and responsibilities
of the different spheres and actors with regard to HIV services.’
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Over time the respective roles of the national, provincial and regional/district levels have
become reasonably defined in practice (Table 3.2). There has been some deconcentration of
responsibility along the national–provincial–regional axis, but most of the strategic direction
and authority within the HIV/AIDS programme remains at the centre. A number of
respondents complained that the national and provincial levels were still too involved in
programme implementation.
The role of local government in HIV service provision remains an important area of
uncertainty. Though there is significant variation between municipalities, HIV activities at the
local government level remain fairly limited and no HIV responsibilities have been specifically
devolved to the local sphere. Many local government respondents felt that the resources and
advantages of local government were not being adequately utilised in the government’s
HIV/AIDS strategy. They argued that the local sphere provided better access to communities
and community based organisations, were better situated to mobilise and integrate local
resources, and would facilitate a more developmental approach to HIV/AIDS.
HIV/AIDS Coordination
Coordination and integration has clearly been identified as a priority within the DoH and the
HIV/AIDS programme. Partly reflecting the priorities outlined in the Strategic Plan, most
attention has focused on improving national-provincial coordination, inter-departmental
coordination and inter-sectoral coordination. Other categories such as intra-departmental
coordination and provincial-local coordination have received less attention. With regard to HIV
services, interactions between provincial and local officials appear to be limited to very local
initiatives and very specific issues. Many local government services function quite
independently of the national programmes even when there is significant overlap of activities
such as in the setting up of VCT sites or contracting with NGOs. In the absence of formal
relationships local government managers often have to rely on informal and personal
connections, which was not seen as ideal.
A number of different coordination mechanisms have been utilised. The Strategic Plan seems
to have been particularly influential while coordination structures have varied in their
effectiveness; some structures have played a critical role whereas others exist in name only.
Nevertheless, the structures have tended to proliferate. In some instances, the establishment
of new structures appears to have become an end in itself, hindering coordination rather than
facilitating it. As one official complained:
’There is no coordination of the coordination’.
Most coordination initiatives have focused on political channels
of coordination which do not necessarily result in improved
coordination of service delivery. Similarly, the nature of the
coordination required is rarely specified. Many respondents
suggested that simple communication would address many of
the current problems. On the other hand, some provincial and
local interviewees argued that there were lots of discussions
about programme operations but little space for coordinated strategic thinking and problem-
solving among senior managers.
Many local government services function quite independently of the national
programmes even when there is significant overlap of activities such as in the
setting up of VCT sites or contracting with NGOs
Many respondents
suggested that simple
communication would
address many of the
current problems.
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6 What Contextual Factors Influence These Relationships?
The present context of public sector transformation in South Africa is reflected by inter-
governmental relations and the coordination of HIV services. Some important factors include
the current political pressures for service delivery; the prolonged process of local government
restructuring; and the historical legacy of apartheid on municipal level capacity. Within this
changing environment governmental relations are clearly still evolving and developing.
The current organisational culture of the public sector also influences these relationships. For
example, bureaucracies tend to favour formalisation and structural solutions to coordination
problems while the prevailing political culture tends towards accountability to politicians and
the current centralisation tendencies within government.
At the DoH level, the policy process with regard to DHS development has been a key
contextual factor. Prioritising the district level, as well as the uncertain and changing debate
about the role of local government within the DHS, has definitely contributed to the poor
integration and coordination with the local sphere.
Lastly, certain contextual factors contributing to the observed relationships and dynamics are
unique to HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS is seen as requiring a broad, multi-sectoral response, which
significantly increases the number of actors involved and the complexity of coordination. Also,
the urgency of the HIV crisis in South Africa accounts for the preoccupation with
implementation and service delivery rather than slower more developmental approaches.
7 What is the impact on HIV/AIDS service delivery?
The HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan has focused on the rollout of a series of national HIV priority
sub-programmes, particularly VCT (Voluntary Counseling and Testing) and HBC (Home
Based Care). There has clearly been progress in these areas and their implementation has
been fairly well coordinated, at least between the national and provincial departments. Of
concern is that the priority sub-programmes of HIV/AIDS have tended to become rather
centralised and verticalised and are sometimes seen as ends in themselves. Although the
department has prioritised the establishment of structures to support inter-departmental and
inter-sectoral coordination, these have had limited impact on implementing the HIV/AIDS
programme.
The Strategic Plan has been helpful and influential in determining the direction of the
HIV/AIDS strategy. The danger, however, is that where the Plan is weak or deficient, so will
the programme be. So, aspects such as supporting curative HIV services at clinics and
hospitals, or improving provincial-local coordination or intra-departmental integration have
been relatively neglected. A few officials voiced their concerns about the limited space for
strategic engagement and review of current strategies and initiatives.
Informants outside the HIV/AIDS directorate commented on the poor coordination within the
department on HIV issues. They also complained that HIV/AIDS was receiving a
disproportionate share of the attention and resources and that other PHC priorities should not
be neglected.
Lastly, the limited interaction and involvement of local government is understandable in the
light of the uncertainty regarding DHS development, together with the concerns about
municipal capacity and the arrangement of fiscal federal relations. Nevertheless, failing to
Many facility level managers interviewed seemed ill-prepared to take on the extra
workload being allocated to them in relation to HIV services. Their concerns, related to
basic infrastructure and broader systems support, are not adequately addressed within
the current HIV/AIDS plan.
Of concern is that the priority sub-programmes of HIV/AIDS have tended to become
rather centralised and verticalised and are sometimes seen as ends in themselves.
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take full advantage of the resources and more developmental approach of local government
may be particularly detrimental for HIV/AIDS services.
8 How Can Governmental Coordination Be Improved?
This study has explored the complexity of governmental relations and coordination. The
frameworks and approaches developed in relation to the coordination of HIV/AIDS services
are helpful in highlighting some of the tensions and tradeoffs that need to be considered in
improving health system coordination in South Africa:
? There is a tension between achieving short-term delivery objectives - through
mechanisms such as centralisation and verticalisation - and broader, more long-term
developmental goals - such as the strengthening the local sphere of government. An
acceptable balance must be found between the oversight and control role of the national
and provincial spheres and their developmental and support responsibilities.
? Improved coordination requires that the roles of the different actors in the provision of
health services be clarified, particularly within the local sphere.
? The coordination needs must be clearly defined. Some relationships simply need better
communication and information sharing, whereas others may require joint decision-
making.
? A more balanced approach to the different categories of coordination is necessary. Inter-
departmental and inter-sectoral coordination are clearly important but more immediate
priorities may be to facilitate integration within the DoH and to improve coordination
between the provincial and local spheres of government.
? Political buy-in and leadership are critical to the success of health interventions, but
administrative channels of coordination also need to be developed to ensure that
coordination of actual service delivery takes place. The absence of forums for strategic
engagement of senior officials from all three spheres of government is a particular
concern. A further strategy would be to focus on improving political – administrative
relationships.
? Formal structures are frequently seen as the solution to coordination problems though
they have not been uniformly successful. There also needs to be more attention to the
“coordination of coordination” which requires defining clear responsibilities and
relationships between different coordinating structures. Other mechanisms of
coordination, such as information dissemination or integrated planning, should not be
neglected.
? There appears to have been little emphasis on developing shared values between the
different spheres of government, the approach to cooperative governance outlined in the
Constitution. Respondents spoke more of the competition and rivalries between levels
than a shared aim of government delivery. Shifting to more financial mechanisms of
coordination, such as conditional grants and service level agreements, may actually
undermine existing cooperative relations.
? Process issues must be considered in designing inter-governmental relationships, for
example by ensuring that actors affected by the changes participate in their development.
Flexibility and learning through experience will probably be more helpful than technical
expertise in organisational design.
Lastly, although coordination is important, it should be remembered that if coordination
demands too much of the system (in terms of direct or opportunity costs) minimal
interventions requiring reduced coordination might be more appropriate and effective than
maximal interventions requiring excessive coordination.
An acceptable balance must be found between the oversight and control role of the
national and provincial spheres and their developmental and support responsibilities.
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Chapter 4
Local Government’s Role in Delivering Primary Health Care
Summarised from the original research done by the Centre for Policy
Studies (CPS)
Wendy Hall
Health Systems Trust
Background
One of the Local Government and Health (LGH) project’s seven research briefs was designed
to explain and monitor how the structure, functioning and culture of local government is
changing and how, over time, this impacts on the delivery of PHC through the district health
system.
The broad areas of focus of the research were: -
? How is health organised in local government?
? Does local government have the capacity to successfully implement the new district
health system?
? What is the pattern and accountability of local government councils and health
institutions to local health users and other relevant structures / stakeholders?
This research report is drawn from interviews and focus group discussions in the following
three districts and two metropolitan municipalities, conducted during 2002: -
? Mopani District Municipality, Limpopo Province
? Francis Baard District Municipality, Northern Cape Province
? Thabo Mofutsanyane District Municipality, Free State Province
? City of Cape Town, Western Province
? City of Tshwane, Gauteng Province
Most interviews were with local government councillors and officials; very few provincially
employed health officials were included. It is acknowledged that the research was incomplete,
but nevertheless it does give an indication of how stakeholders in health service delivery do
relate to each other and how they perceive the future for health services.
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Findings
The findings from the five study sites, as recorded in the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS)
interim reports, are summarised below under the headings: -
? Geographic factors
? Governance structures
? Health services
? Councillor roles
? Accountability channels
? Expectations of decentralisation
The detailed findings per district municipality and metropolitan municipalities are presented in
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively.
Geographical factors
Detailed geographic information, including population figures, land area and administrative
history, are presented in Table 4.3.
The re-demarcation of health districts and health sub-districts is in itself a challenge for the
communities to adapt to. The municipalities visited are unique in their topography,
infrastructure and socio-economic development, resulting in different health needs requiring
different solutions.
Cross-boundary municipalities, such as between City of Tshwane and North West Province,
are problematic for referrals and equity of services.
The better-resourced municipalities, such as the metros, have a large tax base and are
therefore better placed to address the challenges of improving services. The district
municipalities do not have a sufficient tax base to deliver all PHC and must, therefore, rely on
external sources of revenue. Their low tax base also limits the ability of the district
municipalities to provide other basic essential services such as water and sanitation, thus
presenting unique problems to the municipalities in improving the health status of their
communities.
Governance Structures
To understand health delivery it is important to understand the nature of the structures
responsible for this delivery.
Local government structures have a political and an administrative component.  The mayor
and municipal manager are the respective heads of these components, assisted by a team of
councillors and officials respectively. The mayor and councillors are political appointees,
whereas the management officials are usually professionals in their various fields. The Local
Government Green Paper of 1997 and subsequent local government legislation (Local
Government Structures Act of 1998 and Local Government Systems Act of 2000) make
provision, however, for the municipal manager to be a political appointee.
The number of posts that are created and filled is determined by the budget and other factors.
The rural district municipalities often have simple structures with the mayors taking greater
responsibility for the strategic direction of the municipality and even for the administration.
The metros and the more urban local municipalities have more complex structures.
The immense physical size of some districts and their dispersed population,
such as Frances Baard, present their own challenges in delivering health
services, as do the more densely populated areas.
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The Cities of Cape Town and Tshwane have full hierarchies in place with qualified individuals
appointed to all positions. Tshwane has an executive mayor, with a Mayoral Committee
consisting of councillors dedicated to specific portfolios. In Cape Town the mayor chairs a
multi-party executive committee of councillors responsible for specific portfolios. The mayoral
powers in the metropolitan areas can be extensive, sometimes equivalent to that of the
premier of the province. In contrast Mopani, Thabo Mofutsanyana and Frances Baard District
Municipalities do not have sufficient income to sustain an elaborate hierarchy and the mayor
works closely with a few district appointees and the portfolio committees.
Health Services
Although PHC services were reported to be “relatively accessible”, this is arguably more a
reflection of the respondent’s acceptance of the status quo and limited knowledge of the
national norm of basic health services being available within five kilometres of every person.
In the more rural municipalities of Mopani, Thabo Mofuntsanyane and Frances Baard the
provincial departments of health provide most of the PHC services. In the metropolitan areas
this responsibility is shared between the metro council and the province. As mentioned above,
the rural district municipalities do not generally have the resources to run health services.
Particular districts may have one or more local municipality with the necessary capacity and
these could take on the function on behalf of the district. (e.g. Sol Plaatjies Local Municipality
in Frances Baard District Municipality). The metros, apart from the funding, have the capacity
to take on more PHC services and the political leaders in particular are keen to do so. The
managers, and in particular the financial managers, are more cautious. The City of Cape
Town officials expressed concern about the increasing number of people seeking health care
through the public sector due to rising cost of medical aid. This is eroding into the City’s
budget and they will require additional funds in the future, especially if the city is to take on
additional health services.
Concern was expressed about integrating services and establishing a viable referral system
when there is more than one authority responsible for the services within a district. The metro
municipalities, believing that it is easier for them to address problems of equity, want to take
responsibility for all PHC services within their jurisdiction.
In summary, the two metro councils have organised structures for health service management
and play a significant role in delivering PHC services. In contrast, the district municipalities
currently have a limited role in providing health services and the provincial health department
provides the bulk of the PHC services. Within the district municipalities there are some local
municipalities that do provide significant PHC services.
Councillor Roles
Health professionals expressed some concern about the nature and extent of local
government involvement in health and they fear the possibility of political interference in
technical decision-making. However, councillors responsible for health generally expressed
the wish to take on DHS at the municipal level in a responsible fashion and want to be well
informed on PHC and other health services. Councillors reported consulting widely with health
professionals, political leaders and joining relevant debates. In addition, they report consulting
with communities on their health needs.
Provincial health officials and health portfolio committee members have developed close
working relationships. The members indicated that they rely on the health professionals to
guide them in decisions, not wanting to interfere in any technical decisions. In all
municipalities the councillors indicated that they visit the health facilities and work closely with
provincial health professionals.  They will also discuss with health officials problems that
community members have brought to their attention.
The councillors’ main interest at health facilities was reported as seeing to improved
infrastructure such as water supplies and providing moral support to the staff.
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Accountability channels
Accountability to local communities is central to PHC and DHS. Elected councillors in all
municipalities set this as a top priority. Clinic and ward committees are structures that are
already functioning in most places and are used for community consultation. Some consider
ward committees to be preferable to clinic committees, because the former extend into the
community whereas the latter are concentrated around a specific facility and may not address
the needs of the wider communities. In places, such as the City of Cape Town, ward
committees are not well established. Health Committees are functioning, however, and form
an integral part of community accountability channels through the health forums to the health
portfolio committee.
In rural municipalities, such as Mopani, tensions between the elected councillors and the long
established traditional authorities impact on leadership patterns and thus decision-making.
Here certain senior health officials have developed good working relationships with both
councillors and traditional leaders and, acting as a go-between, have managed to resolve
health-related problems.
Expectations concerning decentralisation
Concluding Remarks
The overall impression of these limited snap-shot views is that the newly created
municipalities are keen to take on the challenges of running PHC services. The newer, more
rural councils appear to lack the necessary capacity. The metros, if given the additional
funding required, appear confident and capable of taking on the services.
The relationship between the district and local municipalities needs to be clarified. The
legislative framework and a strategic plan for decentralisation of health services and the
establishment of the district health system are urgently required. This will alleviate the
uncertainties and the confusions noted during the fieldwork for this study.
.
The general expectation in all municipalities is that health services will be decentralised to
local government. There is, however, no clear strategy as to how or when this will be done,
nor precisely what will be decentralised to which level of local government. This uncertainty
leads to tension between district and local municipalities, particularly where a local
municipality is stronger than the district municipality.
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Table 4.1: Summary of District Municipality Profiles
Mopani DM Frances Baard DM Thabo Mofutsanyane DM
Geography and history See Table 4.3
Health services Dist Munc = Health District
Loc Munc = Health Sub-district
Health Services – PHC
– PDoH mostly – 7 dist hospitals, 63 clinics &
26 mobiles
– LG in Greater Tzaneen and Letabo – 2
clinics
– Dist Munc – some EHS only
Management – PDoH appointed Dist and Sub-Dist
Management Teams
District Health Council – not established
Dist Munc = health district
No subdivisions
Health Services – PHC
– PDoH mostly – 4 dist hospitals, 1 CHC, 15
clinics & 7 mobiles
– LG – in Sol Plaatjie – 9 clinics & 1 mobile
– Dist Munc – some EHS only
Management – PDoH appointed Dist Management
Team
District Health Council – not established
Dist Munc = health district
Loc Munc = Health Sub-district
Health Services – PHC
– PDoH mostly – 8 dist hospitals, 2 CHCs, 28
clinics & 26 mobiles
– LG – in ex local authorities – 43 clinics
– Dist Munc – some EHS only
Management – PDoH appointed Health Manager
and Team
District Health Council – established
Municipal Structures
Political
Administrative
Elected Mayor and Speaker
Mayoral Committee of elected councillors, who are
chairs of portfolio committees.
Health is part of Social Development Services
Most councillors – part-time
Greater Tzaneen – strong Loc Munc with similar
structures
Not established – Mayor responsible for
administrative functions
No appointed Health Manager
Elected Mayor and Speaker
Mayoral Committee of elected councillors, who are
chairs of portfolio committees.
Health is part of Social Development Services
Most councillors – part-time
Sol Plaatjie – strong Loc Munc with similar
structures
Emerging structure
Appointed Municipal Manager
No appointed Health Manager
Elected Mayor and Speaker
Mayoral Committee of elected councillors, who are
chairs of portfolio committees.
Separate Health Portfolio Committee with 2 sub-
committees –
– Consultative Committee
– Policy Committee = DHC
Most councillors – part-time
No strong Loc Munc
Emerging structure
Appointed Municipal Manager
No appointed Health Manager
Strategy and
expectations of
decentralisation
PHC anticipated to be decentralised to Dist Munc –
time frame not known.
Health Portfolio Committee working closely with
Provincial structures in preparation to
decentralisation.
All PHC to be transferred to Dist Munc from April
2003 – Loc Munc responsible for EHS, Dist Munc
balance of PHC
Delayed due to lack of supportive legislation
Technical Task Team – addressing issues of human
resources, finances, health services, health
information and legal/contract
Interim PHA established
PHC services to be decentralised to Dist Munc,
funded by province.
Capacity building being undertaken in preparation
for decentralisation
Functional integration – encouraged to assist with
establishing DHS
District Council active in process
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Mopani DM Frances Baard DM Thabo Mofutsanyane DM
Relationships
Between officials and
politicians
Between district and
local municipalities
Between local govt and
community
Between district
municipality and
province
Close working relationship, as well as with provincial
officials. Councillors not involved with technical
issues, but supportive of improving clinic services
Works closely with all local municipalities.
Each local municipality is represented on the District
Social Services Portfolio Committee
Link with community through local municipality
representation on District Social Services Portfolio
Committee, ward committees and clinic committees.
Some tension between political and traditional
leadership structures
Provincial health officials assist with mediating
between the two structures
Collaborate on strategic planning issues. PDoH
director for health in the district attends all Health
Portfolio Committee meetings.
Councillors visit clinics and reportedly have closer
relationship with provincial health officials than with
provincial politicians
Close working relationship developed – small, new
unit offering support and guidance to each other
Relationship with Sol Plaatjie Loc Munc has some
tension due to greater strength and experience in
health services in the Loc Munc. Some suggestions
that Sol Plaatjie should be responsible for PHC
services, on agency basis for the Dist Munc – but
this is contrary to Provincial strategies.
No close link with community, except in DMA.
Loc Munc (e.g. Sol Plaatjie) closer relationship
through Ward Committees and Clinic Committees.
Form communication bridge between community
and health services
Close working relationship to develop strategies and
plans for decentralisation of PHC services.
Close relationship also between Sol Plaatjie Loc
Munc and Province – possibly adds to tension
between the two levels of Loc Govt.
Co-operate in appointment of staff
Mayor and Municipal Manager meet weekly and
work closely with each other
Meetings held with Provloc – to discuss
intergovernmental interactions
Possibly some tensions between new political and
old administrative structures
Good working relationship with all local
municipalities.
Link with community is through The Health Forum,
comprising the chairs of all clinic committees in the
district.
Developing strong inter-governmental relationships
seen as priority by Premier of the Free State.
Well-structured relationship developed between
spheres of government.
PHA meets quarterly with the DHC
Councillors and district health management team
work closely together
Inter-sectoral collaboration evident in the ISRDS
node
Loc Munc = Local Municipality
Dist Munc = District Municipality
PDoH = Provincial Department of Health
LG = Local Government
EHS = Environmental Health Services
PHA = Provincial Health Authority
DHC = District Health Council
CHC = Community Health Centre
ISRDS – Integrated Sustainable Rural Development
Strategy
Provloc = Provincial Local Government Association
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Table 4.2: Summary of Metropolitan District Profiles
City of Cape Town City of Tshwane
Geography and history Previously part of Cape Province
No previous homelands
Long history of local government and PHC health services
Previously part of Transvaal
Small portion ex homeland – Odi District
Long history of local government and PHC health services
Health services City of Cape Town – well structured health services
Divided into eight health sub-districts
District Health Authority established
Services being integrated between two spheres
Health Services – PHC
– PDoH – 2 district hospitals, 47 clinics
– City of CT – 109 clinics, EHS services
Management – each sphere has own health management team, who
meet regularly.
PHC services provided by City of Tshwane and PDoH, through regional
office
Municipal Council fulfils the role of the District Health Authority
Services being integrated between two spheres
Health Services – PHC
– PDoH – 4 district hospitals, 4 CHCs, 22 clinics & 9 mobiles
– City of Tshwane – 29 clinics and 3 mobiles
Management – each sphere has own health management team, who
meet regularly.
Municipal Structures
Political
Administrative
Elected executive mayor
Executive mayoral committee – members are full time councillors and
each responsible for a portfolio committee
Health joined with amenities and sport
City divided into 16 sub-councils
Established governance structures – Ward Committees and Health
Forums
Political power evenly balanced between ANC and DA
Established administrative structures
Appointed Municipal Manager
Appointed Health Manager with health management team
Elected executive mayor
Executive mayoral committee – members are full time councillors and
each responsible for a portfolio committee
Health part of Social Development Portfolio Committee
Political power dominated by ANC
Established administrative structures
Appointed Municipal Manager
Appointed Health Manager with health management team
Strategy and expectations of
decentralisation
Western Cape committed to decentralize PHC to City of CT
Transfer was expected to start in June 2002, but delayed due to lack of
legislative framework
Anticipated that PHC will remain provincial responsibility, with the City
being responsible for EHS only – this is welcomed by financial
managers in the City because of the rising cost of PHC due to rising
medical aid costs and urbanization.
Gauteng PDoH expects to decentralize PHC services to the Metros and
Dist Munc
City of Tshwane ready to accept the services provided there is
additional funding.
Councillors have been trained and are ready to accept the services.
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City of Cape Town City of Tshwane
Relationships
Between officials and
politicians
Between local govt and
community
Between metropolitan
municipality and province
Close working relationship over many years.
Health Portfolio Committee relies on officials for technical guidance, but
members are not involved with technical issues.
Health services managed by experienced health professionals.
Political considerations – evident in appointment of three successive city
managers within few years.
Structures for formal communication in place –
– To the Health Portfolio Committee via the 16 sub-councils
– To the Cape Metro Health Forum via the 11 District Health
Forums
Ward Committees not well established as formal accountability
structures. Health Committees within geographical areas usually deal
with health issues.
Health Manager reported to have ‘open door’ policy with community and
has established good relationships with the community.
Close working relationship established
11 of the 47 provincial community health centres are run jointly.
Regular meetings held between the two – ensuring common strategies
for health service delivery
Inter-government relations complicated by political turmoil in the
province
Councillors communicate directly with health officials for advise, but are
not directly involved in technical decisions
Health Manager and health team are all experienced health
professionals.
No major controversies between the two.
There are few functional clinic committees used as accountability
structures to the community
Politicians consult communities through Ward Committees
Clinic committees and ward committees are beginning to interact with
each other.
Relationship is generally good.
Have shared vision for decentralisation of health services – but Metro
frustrated by delays.
Councillors visit the health facilities and are familiar with national and
provincial legislation and policies
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Table 4.3 District Municipalities
District Municipality Local Municipality Population Area (km2) Pop Density (/km2) Former Administrative Authority Rural/Urban Wards
Francis Baard Sol Plaatjie 215857 1877 115 Former RSA Mixed 27
Northern Cape Phokane 62498 830 75 Mostly former homeland Rural 9
Dikgatlong 39056 2378 16 Mostly former RSA Rural 7
Marageng 23745 1541 15 Mostly former RSA Rural 5
Diamondfields District Management Area (DMA) 4819 5720 1 Mostly former RSA Rural 0
TOTAL 345975 12346 28 48
Mopani Greater Giyani 257531 2967 87 Former homeland Mostly rural 25
Limpopo Greater Letaba 238217 1871 127 Former homeland and RSA Mostly rural 23
Greater Tzaneen 408849 3260 125 Mostly former RSA Mixed 33
Ba-Phalaborwa 129063 3000 43 Mostly former RSA Mixed 14
TOTAL 1033660 11098 93 95
Thabo Mofutsanyane Maluti a Phofung 383337 4421 87 Mostly former homeland Mixed 34
Free State Setsoto 119112 5966 20 Former homeland and RSA Rural 16
Dihlabeng 116302 4739 25 Former homeland and RSA Mixed 17
Nketoana 69756 5611 12 Former homeland and RSA Rural 9
Phumelela 49151 7548 7 Former homeland and RSA Rural 7
Golden Gate National Park (DMA) 670 61 11 Former RSA 0
TOTAL 738328 28346 26 83
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Chapter 5
Assessing Health Content and Health Sector Participation
in Selected Municipal Integrated Development Plans
Summary by Ross Haynes
From original research by Rene Moodaley7
Background
Enhanced inter-sectoral collaboration (ISC) is seen as a key potential advantage of
decentralisation. Legislation, through the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, makes provision
and calls for ISC and cooperative governance.  Both approaches can contribute to improved
health service delivery.  However, there are no tools available for monitoring and evaluating
ISC.  Addressing the root causes of poor health, such as poverty, inadequate nutrition, poor
sanitation, lack of potable water and poor housing, requires collaboration between a number
of state service providers.
                                                
The full report on this research, of which the chapter is a summary, can be downloaded in pdf format
from www.hst.org.za
Moodaley R,  Rapid Appraisal of the Health Content of selected Municipal Integrated Development
Plans.  Health Systems Trust, 2004,  Durban.
The Integrated Development Plan was identified as a possible tool to monitor how
different sectors are working together within local government in addressing health
needs in the community.
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Methodology
The aim of this study was to review the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) from selected
municipalities in South Africa’s nine provinces. One district or metropolitan municipality was
selected per province, plus two local municipalities from within eight of the nine selected
district municipalities and one local municipality from the ninth.
The main objective was to assess the quantity and content of health-related information in the
IDPs and the involvement of the provincial and local health officials in the IDP process. The
study looks at the first generation of IDPs which were to be adopted in April 2002.
The primary source of information was the IDP documents. However information was also
gathered from reports and publications from government departments, health development
agencies and a number of key informant interviews.
Summary of Findings
Budgeted allocation for health-related development projects as a percentage of the total IDP
budget varied considerably (from 47% to less than1%) This variation could reflect the varying
importance that municipalities assign to health issues, but could also reflect historic need or
other more pressing needs in the municipal area which affected the prioritising process and
thus the budget allocation.
Inadequate information prevented a reliable assessment of the health officials’ participation in
the IDP processes.  Generally indications point towards inadequate participation, although
some IDPs nevertheless contained good health information.
The nature of health projects undertaken by different municipalities varied greatly.
Categorising these into infrastructural, curative and preventative type projects suggests that
most projects fall into the first two categories.  HIV/AIDS related projects, the main component
of the third category, were given high priority, presumably as a result of corresponding
emphasis in the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) IDP guidelines.
These projects however, are frequently presented in isolation and do not link holistically with
other health activities.  In a similar vein, another national health priority programme, Maternal,
Child and Women’s Health (MCWH), which was not prioritised in the IDP guidelines, was not
included in any of the IDPs.
Although the IDP document is meant to incorporate health care plans as one of approximately
ten sector or service delivery plans, none of the IDPs assessed included such a plan.  In most
cases there appears to be little linkage between the health care plans compiled by the
provincial structures at district level and the IDP development process.
The information contained in the IDPs was also not sufficient to draw conclusions about the
degree of inter-sectoral collaboration in a particular area.
Note was taken of those IDPs reflecting good practice on the ground, such as meaningful
community participation, vertical and horizontal coordination and alignment, good information
exchange, effective communication channels and logical flow in the identification of projects.
A review of selected first generation Integrated Development Plans indicate
little health content, and limited involvement of provincial and district health
officials.
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Conclusion
The health sector relies on all three spheres of government, NGO’s and the private sector to
realise its aims.  Each sphere of government is responsible for providing different services.
This study re-emphasises the inter-connectedness of health and development.
Improvements in health, environmental and socio-economic issues require inter-sectoral
efforts.  Such efforts, involving education, housing, public works and community groups,
including businesses, schools and universities and religious, civic and cultural organizations,
are aimed at promoting sustainable development in the communities.
As a first time study, no benchmarks were available for purposes of comparison.  At the same
time, this study deals with the first round of IDPs in the municipalities.  The study does,
however, provide a baseline for future studies.  Future IDPs should reflect the impact of
service level agreements between provincial health departments, district municipalities and
local municipalities with joint planning activities between province and district concerning
health service delivery.  The extent of services provided will vary according to the capacity of
specific municipalities and service agreements set up between provinces and municipalities.
Although the DPLG IDP Guidelines8 encourage the inclusion of sector specific plans, the
Municipal Systems Act does not legislate for a health plan as a separate output in the IDP
process.  From this perspective health issues would arise and be included in the IDP through
emerging as local needs and priorities – from a consultative process or as direct
responsibilities. This would result in the role of health planning in the IDP process varying,
depending on the type of municipality and the local context.  From a health perspective,
however, section 38 of the National Health Bill of 2003, likely to be promulgated in the near
future, requires District Health Plans to be integrated into the respective IDP.
While assessing the health content of IDPs in selected municipalities, it is important to
remember the changing context of decentralising health to local government, and therefore its
impact, over the past few years.  For both municipal and health officials, developing the IDPs
in question took place during a time of great uncertainty with little assurance of who would be
responsible for what.  The Constitution, without defining it, makes municipal health services
(MHS) a local government responsibility.  Expectations about the final definition vacillated
between the full basket of primary health care services to a selection of environmental health
services, but always with the national vision of a municipality-based district health system as
a backdrop. . Provisions in the National Health Bill of 2003 define MHS as a list of
environmental health services (excluding port health, control of hazardous substances and
malaria control) and make MHS a district and metropolitan municipality responsibility,
although with provision to appoint local municipalities as implementing agents.
Good participation in the Eastern Cape sites demonstrates the value of a municipality actively
reaching out to its communities and not only to those citizens who have the means, influence
and power to participate but to those who normally do not have a voice.  The study further
suggests that it was frequently members of the community who had access to certain levels
of information, or who had a particular interest in the affairs of the municipality, who actively
participated in the IDP.
Successful exchange of information is a basic condition for effective coordination.  Decision-
makers require information in order to decide on priorities, select appropriate programmes
and adapt them to changing needs.
Communication channels should be established or strengthened and formalised, mainly by
regular meetings and reports (as described by the municipalities appraised in the Eastern
Cape).  At a project level, general meetings with the community, traditional leaders,
                                                
8 DPLG (undated).  IDP Guide Pack – Guide V: Sectors and Dimensions.  Department of Provincial
and Local Government, Pretoria
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businesses and political organisations should be complemented by meetings at a sector
department level.  Properly organised meetings working to a prepared agenda and chaired by
the person responsible for co-ordination produce the best results.
Although the study was not particularly effective in assessing the exact role that the health
sector played in development of the IDP’s it does provide circumstantial evidence of
increased prioritisation of health needs linked to greater health sector involvement. This
supports the imperative for health officials to view the IDPs differently and support a
sufficiently senior level of involvement.  The provisions of the National Health Bill should
provide the necessary leverage for those responsible for the IDP process, such as the
Municipal Manager, to elicit adequate health sector participation.
Recommendations
The study strengthens the notion that integrated development
planning is a useful tool for promoting equity, inter-sectoral
coordination and the optimal use of scarce resources.
1. Promote a greater understanding of the IDP processes and the health
management structures amongst
o health officials, especially the IDP’s role in sourcing municipal funds for
development projects and its potential in aligning sectoral resources towards
achieving mutual aims.  Such mutual aims could include ensuring that a new
clinic has a road, water supply and sanitation facilities, electricity, and access
to agricultural and welfare inputs - all aimed at promoting the development of a
healthier community.
o councillors and municipal officials require an understanding of the health
management structures, including the emerging health legislation, and should
press for the full involvement of health (and other sector-linked) officials in the
IDP process.
2. Promote health care plans as a tool for enhancing coordinated health
services delivery by
o developing and sharing a standard version of a health care plan. This will
assist all involved in using this as a tool in planning the overall development
process within the respective municipal area
3. Promote Community Participation by ensuring that
o municipalities proactively reach out to all the members of their community so
as to draw on their local knowledge and to promote acceptance and ownership
of the IDP.
4. Ensure vertical and horizontal alignment
o thereby minimising duplication and maximising effective use of resources.
5. Ensure effective communication
° through regular sharing of correct and relevant information along agreed
communication channels.
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Chapter 6
Public-Private Interactions in the South African Health
Sector 9
Haroon Wadee1, Lucy Gilson1, Duane Blaauw1, Ermin Erasmus1 and Anne Mills2
1 Centre for Health Policy, School of Public Health, University of Witwatersrand
2 Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Background
In many countries health sector reforms are designed to minimise the role of government and
to increase that of the private sector in health service delivery, on the assumption that the
private sector will improve the quality of service delivery, enhance efficiency and improve
equity within the health system. This has been through either privatisation or out-sourcing.
The South African health system has a strong private sector that serves less than one-fifth of
the total population. Before 1994 little attention was paid to the role of the private sector within
the overall health system, leaving it to develop and grow in an unregulated way. Towards the
end of the 1990s attention began to be focused on managing public-private interactions
(PPIs) in ways to achieve health system goals.
At the provincial level a range of PPIs are emerging.  However, the role of private sector with
proposed decentralisation of health to local government is unclear. Vague frameworks and
ambiguous criteria for decision-making could result in unchecked growth in the type and
content of PPIs.
                                                
The full report on this research, of which the chapter is a summary, can be downloaded in pdf format
from www.hst.org.za
Wadee H., Gilson L., Blaauw D, Erasmus E and Mills, A. (2004): Public-Private Interactions in the South
African Health Sector: Experience and Perspectives from National, Provincial and Local Levels.  The
Local Government and Health Consortium, Health Systems Trust, Durban. 2004.
There is a growing interest within government for the private
sector to play a role in service delivery.
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Methods
This study sought to map current PPI initiatives within provincial and local government as a
basis for future planning. It looked at what constitutes PPIs, their range, the forces influencing
their development and their potential implications.
The study used qualitative and quantitative methods. A review of health economics, health
policy, public administration and privatisation literature provided insights into both national
and international experiences of PPIs. A conceptual framework to describe and monitor
health sector PPIs was developed. Document reviews, key-informant interviews, a national
survey and a media analysis were undertaken to map PPIs, outline the policy environment
and to understand PPI drivers. There was a low response rate to the survey, partly due to the
complexity of the questionnaire and partly due to the lack of capacity in newly established
municipalities. However, the information was useful for the mapping exercise and highlighted
the difficulty of gathering evidence of the impact of PPIs.
Policy Context
The South African PPI experience pre-dates 1994 and includes a range of clinical and non-
clinical contracting. For example, these PPIs included contracts with State-Aided hospitals
such as SANTA and with Lifecare for tuberculosis and psychiatric care and the appointment
of private clinicians as part-time district surgeons to improve access in under-resourced
areas.
After the 1994 elections there was minimal policy development dealing with the private sector.
The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Health System (South Africa 1997)
provides a vision for a unified health system that includes co-ordination between the public
and private sectors. This provided the basis for the development of a coherent Private-Public
Partnership (PPP) policy by the National Department of Health (NDoH) in 1999. The Limpopo
(June 1997), Eastern Cape (April 1998) and Western Cape (August 1998) provincial
departments of health developed PPP documents. These influenced the national policy
document that was accepted in November 2000 by the Provincial Health Restructuring
Committee (PHRC), less than three months after the National Treasury established a PPP
unit.
In June 2000 National Treasury established a PPP unit to support and approve provincial
government PPPs, and in September 2000 detailed PPP guidelines in line with the Public
Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 1999 were finalised. Treasury-approved PPPs in health
include the Nkosi Albert Luthuli private finance initiative (PFI) and the Free State hospital co-
location agreements. These arrangements however are not fully covered in the NDoH PPP
document. An NDoH PPI Working Group was established in early 2001 to address
discrepancies between the narrower National Treasury PPP guidelines and the NDoH PPP
document.  This group presented a document at the National Health Summit in November
2001. PPIs were identified as a priority area at the Summit and in July 2002 a PPI Lekgotla
with major stakeholders from all spheres of government, private funders, private providers
and trade unions was held.
Within local government the Municipal PPP pilot programme was initiated in 1997 and by
March 1998 the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) was established. By early
1999 landmark water privatisation contracts were signed in Dolphin Coast and in Nelspruit.
The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and Municipal Systems Act of 2000 endorse private
sector partnerships to meet infrastructure backlogs and to improve service delivery. However,
there are no guidelines to co-ordinate health-specific PPIs within the local sphere of
government. The South African Constitution of 1996 allocates powers and functions to local
government that makes it difficult for both National and Provincial health departments as well
as National Treasury to enforce PPP guidelines at this level.
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Mapping health sector PPIs
Two broad sets of PPIs were identified:
o Those that manage relationships; include
– interactions such as formal and informal dialogue,
– policy and patient transfer protocols.
For the most part, these facilitate discussion and engagement between the sectors,
building trust and providing a foundation for service delivery PPIs.
o Those that support service delivery; include
– Purchased services – refers to purchasing clinical services
– Outsourced non-clinical services
– Joint-ventures – can be either a lease or service model
– Private Finance Initiative (PFI) – raising capital on private money markets for
infrastructure investment through a private consortium
– Other innovative interactions such as asset swap.
At local government level, most PPIs take the form of purchased services for primary care.
These purchased services are primarily linked to individual providers, clinical support services
(radiology, pathology) and some home-based palliative care involving a range of for-profit and
non-profit private providers. The non-clinical outsourcing that occurs includes waste
management and security services. There are a few examples of joint ventures such as
sharing under-utilised public facilities with general practitioners in return for services beyond
clinic operating times.
Non-clinical contracting is common at the provincial level and includes catering, security,
laundry and porter services. These are primarily implemented at hospital level care and
involve purchased services and joint ventures.
Service model arrangements range from Co-location Agreements (a form of lease
arrangement in which spare public hospital capacity is leased to private providers) to the
development of differentiated amenities within public hospitals (which may involve an
agreement with private funders to allow insured patients to use the better amenities).
The nature of PPIs is all-encompassing and may include formal Treasury-approved PPPs,
such as the Free State Hospital Co-location Agreements, alongside other forms of interaction
that do not necessarily conform to the narrow prescriptions of Treasury’s PPP unit.
The range of private agents involved in provincial PPIs is diverse, and includes hospital
companies, private funders and specialist clinical and non-clinical companies. A new form of
outsourcing that is emerging at provincial level focuses on general management functions at
facility and other levels. Private ‘transaction advisors’ are being employed to manage the
Treasury PPP process between provinces, Treasury and private investors/service providers.
This is likely to increase as more provinces embark on PPPs that require Treasury approval.
PFIs were identified at all levels of government, although to a limited extent at the local
government level where the term may have been misunderstood. In one case it was applied
to private donations for infrastructure investment, which is different from the long-term
contractual nature of the Treasury PFI approach. At provincial level, the provincial health
department manage the PPIs with considerable support from the national level (Treasury and
Health). These are used to revitalise and equip existing facilities, or to build and equip new
PPI policy development is a complex matter. The development of parallel
guidelines and the gaps that have been identified in these puts PPI
development at risk of being uncoordinated, and possibly undermining the
health system.
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ones. This may include equipping facilities with the latest hi-tech medical and non-medical
technology, such as the Nkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital PFI. Elsewhere the plan is to purchase
non-medical equipment through a PFI.
The types and forms of PPIs being implemented vary quite considerably between areas and
authorities. For instance KwaZulu-Natal is keen on PFIs, Western Cape prefers co-location
and Gauteng is in favour of a combination of PFIs and differentiated amenities. One
innovative form of PPI to emerge in the Western Cape is the ‘asset swap’ in which private
investors are offered prime property owned by the province, and in return are required to
rebuild and equip facilities in under-served areas.
Demonstrating the blurred boundaries
Service delivery whether publicly or privately owned involves a core set of functions with
respect to financing, capital ownership and provision. But with PPIs these boundaries
between the two sectors are blurred and may even overlap. Table 6.1 highlights this blurring,
and hence the complex nature of PPIs. It considers two different forms of the ‘purchased
service’ category of PPI, namely contracting session doctors and contracting renal treatment.
Table 6.1: Application of Technical Characteristics Analysis to Highlight Complexity of
PPIs.
With session doctors capital and recurrent financing and ownership is public. However, the
health care provider is both public and private. The individual is a private practitioner but
works within a public facility. The case of the public sector contracting renal treatment from
the private sector involves a different allocation of roles. Although capital ownership, capital
financing and health care provider functions lie in the hands of the private sector, recurrent
financing is provided by the public sector through its purchase of services.
This comparison illustrates that even within one PPI category, such as purchased services;
public and private stakeholders may take responsibility for a different combination of
functions. Managing PPIs is, thus, a complex task that requires careful consideration of the
details of each PPI
What drives PPI development in the South African Health Sector?
In analysing the driving forces behind PPI development in the health sector it is important to
understand the objectives of both the stakeholders responsible for initiating them, and of the
PPIs themselves. These objectives provide a sense of why PPIs are being implemented, but
do not assess whether they are achieving these objectives.
PPIs that manage relationships facilitate discussion between the public and private sectors,
build trust and lay a foundation for service delivery PPIs, which have a wider range of
objectives. Table 6.2 highlights the similarity and differences in objectives between PPI
categories. Purchased services and joint-ventures may promote equity; while outsourced non-
clinical services and PPPs promotes efficiency.
Capital
Financing
Recurrent
Financing
Capital
Ownership
Healthcare
Provider
Session Doctors Public Public
(collective tax)
Public Private/Public
Renal
Treatment
Private Public
(collective tax)
Private Private
The mapping analysis shows a wide range of PPIs in operation. Although
some cases these interactions include Treasury-approved PPPs, this is
not the dominant form of PPI taking place in the health sector.
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Table 6.2: Objectives of PPIs by Category
PPI category Objectives
Purchased services • Improve access
• Improve quality of care
• Improve service delivery in areas of need
• Promote public health role of private practitioners.
• Tapping into external expertise
Outsourced Non-Clinical Services • Reduce costs
• Improved access
• Improved quality of care
• Shifting risk of capital investment to private
sector.
Joint-Ventures • Higher quality services
• Lower costs
• Revenue generation
• Improved access
• Improved efficiency via improved resource use
PFIs • Access to private sector finance and expertise
• Value-for-money
• Affordability
• Savings to health care purchasers
• Improved management
• Addressing infrastructure backlogs
Treasury-Approved PPPs • Risk transfer to private sector
• Affordability
• Value-for-money
• Improved economies of scale
• Improved service delivery
Other
(Asset Swap)
• Improve access
• Addressing infrastructure backlogs
Objectives also differ between stakeholders (see Table 6.3). For instance the NDoH is
concerned with strengthening the health system, improving equity and containing costs,
whereas the National Treasury emphasises the need to address infrastructure backlogs, get
value-for-money and shift risk to the private sector. The public sector is more concerned with
improving health system equity, whilst private hospitals and funders are concerned with
generating a profit.
Linked to objectives are drivers, which are the key contextual factors influencing the range of
objectives of the stakeholders. Like the objectives the drivers differ between stakeholders
(see Table 6.3). For instance, the NDoH is concerned with cost escalation in the private
sector, misdistribution of resources and budgetary constraints. Although the National
Treasury is concerned with budgetary constraints as well, one of their major concerns is the
backlog in infrastructure development.
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Table 6.3: Comparative Overview of Objectives and Drivers by Four Key Stakeholders
Stakeholders Objectives Drivers
National
Department of
Health
1. Strengthening the health
system
2. Cost containment in the
health sector
3. Revenue Generation
4. Improving equity of
financing and access
5. Improving efficiency
1. Fragmented health system
2. Cost-escalation in the private sector
3. Budgetary constraints
4. Mal-distribution of resources across
public/private sector relative to
population served, leading to poor
coverage and access for poorest
income groups; as well as poor
value for money of South African
health system (as shown by low
rating in World Health Report 2001)
5. Budgetary constraints; under-
utilised resources within the
system.
National Treasury 1. Shifting risk to the private
sector
2. Value-for-Money
3. Addressing infrastructure
backlogs
1. Budgetary constraints
2. Budgetary constraints
3. Infrastructure backlogs
Private Funders 1. Reduce costs
2. Improve access
3. Improve efficiency
4. Strengthening the health
system
5. Profit
6. Enhancing trust between
the public and private
sectors
1. Cost escalation in private sector
2. Lack of access to medical
insurance and private healthcare;
declining market; market saturation
3. Under-utilised resources within
system
4. Fragmented health system
5. Declining market; market saturation
6. Lack of trust between the sectors
Private Hospital
Companies
1. Enhanced efficiency
2. Improved perceptions of the
private sector
3. Profit
4. Staff retention
5. Enhancing trust between
the public and private
sectors
1. Duplication in health system
2. Negative perceptions of private
sector by government
3. Declining market; market saturation
4. Personnel exodus abroad
5. Lack of trust between the sectors
Differences between stakeholders have the potential to allow PPIs to generate negative
impacts on the health system, leading to possible fragmentation of the services and
generating additional costs. The confusing frameworks for PPIs have the potential to
complicate their management. This in turn may result in poor management. There is a tension
between the private sector profit motivation and the public sector equity objective.
Strengthening the health system may emerge as a shared objective, but if this is not explicitly
stated it may be undermined by a clash of motives, causing a lack of trust between the
sectors and possible further fragmentation of the health system.
The PPI Working Group, the National Health Summit, the PPI Lekgotla, and provincial public-
private forums have identified the need to bring stakeholders together to develop mutually
acceptable frameworks in order to enhance mutual trust between the sectors.
Potential Problems of PPIs
During interviews public sector stakeholders raised a number of potential problems that may
result from PPI implementation. These include:
o The lack of a legislative framework to guide provincial departments
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o The lack of strong and specific capacity within all spheres and levels of the public
sector to deal with the complex PPI negotiation processes, to ensure that the private
sector does not take advantage of the public sector
o The difficulty of establishing measurable outcomes for inclusion in the contract
o  The lack of adequate resources to support the necessary development of skills and
systems
o The complexity of managing public perceptions around PPIs to avoid them
undermining support for the public sector.
Private sector stakeholders raised the following concerns:
o Lack of trust between the sectors
o Lack of clarity or transparency around government decision-making processes
o Lack of national co-ordination in PPI decision-making requiring provincial
engagement
o Risk-averseness on the part of the government undermining private sector willingness
to enter into PPI
o Problems with government procedures such as timely payment
o Quality of care problems in the public sector
o The trade union opposition to privatisation.
Trade unions concerns raised include:
o PPIs leading to ‘tiering’ within the health sector;
o The private sector having no incentive to serve the poor;
o Lack of government capacity to fully analyse potential PPIs.
Conclusions
Three inter-linked conclusions can be drawn from this analysis;
I. There is a lack of clarity or vision around the potential and problems of PPI
development within the health sector, and between and within spheres of government.
This leads to diverse understandings and developments across the country. There are
inadequate and confusing guidelines for policy development and implementation of PPIs.
Some guidelines are health specific, whereas others, such as the National Treasury
(2000; 2001) Public-Private Partnership (PPP) guidelines, are applicable to other sectors.
II. Managing PPIs is complex and challenging. A wide range of PPIs are being
implemented with a range of different objectives. In the absence of coherent frameworks,
the task of ensuring that PPIs strengthen the health system is difficult. Every PPI has a
complex set of relationships between public and private stakeholders with respect to
financing, provision and ownership.
III. Adequate capacity in contract negotiation, monitoring and evaluation is needed to
effectively manage the process of developing health sector PPIs.  This will ensure that
health policy goals are realised, and not undermined, by PPIs.
There is little knowledge and understanding of the range of PPIs being developed across the
country and their cost and benefits to the health sector. The potential impact of PPIs on
service delivery are not being monitored or evaluated.
The key dangers of uncoordinated action around PPIs
is the risk of further fragmenting the health system and of generating additional
costs and burdens for the public sector.
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 Implement the vision outlined in the 2001 National Summit PPI document. This seeks
to strengthen the capacity of the public sector to develop and implement PPIs –
including the capacity to choose not to implement PPIs.
 Establish a PPI unit within the NDoH to
– communicate a unified vision,
– develop specific frameworks and guidelines,
– co-ordinate PPI development across government,
– support dialogue between the sectors,
– provide operational support to both provincial and local government
management,
– offer relevant training and
– coordinate the monitoring and evaluation of PPI experiences and their impact on
service delivery.
 Secure funding and human resources for effective functioning of the national PPI
unit.
Policy Recommendations
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Chapter 7
The State of Decentralisation in the South African Health
Sector, 2003
Lucy Gilson
Centre for Health Policy
Background
The central aim of this chapter is to assess the current (as at 2003) state of decentralisation
within the health sector, and the key challenges facing it. It draws on evidence from all of the
studies undertaken within this programme of work, and as briefly outlined in earlier chapters.
The second section summarises the core findings, and the third section presents a more
detailed justification of them.
This work was undertaken as the National Health Bill, and its recommendations concerning
the future role of Local Government in health care management and delivery, were being
finalised. Nonetheless, the conclusions presented here take as their starting point the
National Health Bill’s definition of the Municipal Health Services (MHS) to be provided by
Local Government. These include a list of environmental health services. Other health
services may be delegated or assigned to Local Government, per agreement between the
municipality and the MEC for health.
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Strengths and weaknesses of health system decentralisation
1994-2003
The evaluation of health sector decentralisation identifies five main achievements of the last
ten years. They are:
? The creation of new provincial administrations and governance structures that can enable
wider health system change
? Moves towards the adoption of an enabling and co-ordinating role by the national Health
Department
? The consolidation of effective national-provincial co-ordination structures and the
development of (generally) trusting relations between these two spheres of governance
? The development of structures, approaches and some informal relationships as means of
co-ordinating and supporting service delivery throughout the country
? The emergence of a willingness, even in newly formed municipalities, to assume
responsibilities for health service provision.
However, over this period two main problems have been experienced. First, there are
continued geographical inequities in health system resource allocation, indicating gross
inequities in the distribution of human resources and physical infrastructure between and
within provinces. Second, only a limited degree of decentralisation in health sector
management has actually been achieved. As a result, the promise of the early achievements
of DHS development (Gilson et al. 1996) have been hard to sustain and build on.
Underlying these problems are four main sets of obstacles:
? Uncertainty over the role of local government in the health system, that is only now (2003)
being resolved through the long-awaited framework of the National Health Bill
? Persistent capacity weaknesses in the health system, despite the great amount of training
provided
? A hierarchical and rigid bureaucratic culture
? Some reluctance on the part of provincial governments and health departments to
decentralise authority to lower levels
Yet some experiences over the last ten years also provide pointers about how these
obstacles can be tackled. These experiences are considered in Chapter 8
(Recommendations).
The state of health system decentralisation in 2003
The achievements and obstacles outlined in the previous section are explained and justified
here through three sets of analyses. They are:
• a review of health system performance across geographic areas
• a mapping of the room for decision-making at each level of government
• an explanation of the factors influencing this map of decision-space.
Health system performance
As outlined in Chapter 1 (Financing and Equity), the study on
resource allocation provides a comprehensive analysis of
health resource allocations at municipality level within South
Africa; the first time such an analysis has been undertaken.
The chapter shows that budgetary allocations between
municipalities are inequitable, in that those with least funding
have greatest needs (as measured by populations weighted by
deprivation) and those with most funding have the least needs.
The five best-funded health districts claim 43% of national funding for primary health care
activities which are provided outside of hospitals, although they are home to only 28% of the
The five best-funded
health districts claim 43%
of national funding for
primary health care
activities which are
provided outside of
hospitals, although they
are home to only 28% of
the population.
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population. These funding allocations are reflected in personnel allocations between and
within provinces, which also do not reflect the distribution of population or needs. But
provincial governments are doing little to tackle these inequities. They do not use measures of
need to guide budgeting or personnel allocations, nor offset differences between
municipalities in their capacity to raise revenue.
In addition, both Chapters 1 and 2 provide examples of continuing inefficiencies and problems
with the way resources are used within the health system. Too little funding is allocated to
primary care, although this level is better able to address the health needs of the majority of
the population than other levels of service. The budgets of at least forty district municipalities
in 2001/02 were, thus, too low (on a per capita basis) to fund the agreed primary health care
package of services. This situation of under-funding may also get worse as a result of how
Municipal Health Services are defined in the National Health Bill. The potential loss of local
government own revenue to the health sector is estimated to be in the region of R1.0 billion
per year in 2001/02 prices. In addition, other resources such as transport are often poorly
managed, with duplication and waste in resource use.
Differences between provinces and municipalities in how activities are implemented may also
make inefficiencies or inequities worse. Chapter 6 (PPI), for example, shows that there are
considerable differences in the types of public-private initiatives (PPIs) being implemented in
different areas of the country. As implementation of PPIs requires new management skills and
systems it is also possible that PPIs will have unexpected and even negative impacts on the
health system, especially in those areas with limited capacity.
Finally, some indications about the strengths and weaknesses of service delivery are
provided through specific consideration of HIV/AIDS services (Chapter 3).
Respondents from across the health system suggest that there has been some progress in
HIV/AIDS service delivery. A comprehensive five year plan has provided a useful framework
to guide service development, and the range of services being provided has expanded over
time (from condom provision to include strengthened STI and TB services, voluntary,
counselling and testing and home-based care). Positive relationships between health care
providers and NGOs as well as effective multi-sectoral action have been important to these
achievements. Municipalities have expressed their readiness to take on some responsibilities
for tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic, especially since the Integrated Development Plan
guidelines emphasize inputs in this area (chapter 5). Many municipalities have begun,
informally, to co-ordinate their actions with provincial facilities and managers.
However, several common concerns about service delivery were also identified. Development
of the HIV/AIDS service delivery package has been slow and has focussed more on
preventive activities than treatment needs. Problems experienced in referral relationships
between clinics and hospitals for HIV/AIDS patients, probably indicate a broader weakness in
the health facility network. Other problems likely to cut across all services include
weaknesses in clarifying cross-boundary responsibilities, limited availability of necessary
equipment and supplies, and transport availability and management problems. Although not
part of this research, it is common knowledge that a central weakness of service delivery
relates to staff – their availability, retention and motivation. Uncertainty about the role of local
government in the health system has made negative impacts on staff morale.
Mapping decision-space
Decentralisation within any governance system always involves the transfer of some set of
decision-making powers from national to sub-national levels (Mills et al. 1991). However, the
extent of decentralisation actually achieved within any system depends on how much power
is transferred for certain decision-making functions. It is helpful to map how much freedom
managers at different levels have to take decisions about their own work (Bossert 1998);
having decision-making power is different from being responsible to undertake certain tasks.
Although facilities may be implementing many activities, they generally do not have much
room to make decisions about whether or not to perform those activities or how to implement
them. Not having such room means they have little decision-making power.
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Table 7.1 provides a picture of decision-making power for South Africa in 2003, drawing on
the detailed evidence of the studies presented in earlier chapters of this report. In the table
the term ‘narrow’ implies a very limited degree of decision-making power, compared with the
‘wide’ decision-space.
Although the table covers only a partial set of management functions, it highlights five
features of health system management decentralisation. It indicates that:
? Little decision-making power lies at facility and district management levels
? Municipalities (before the National Health Act) had greater health management power
than local managers employed by provinces (although this potential varies between
municipalities)
? Provincial Health Departments have important roles in decision-making around health
service delivery within provincial boundaries, including in relation to municipalities
? Local government often functions independently of provincial/national government, and
even has separate legal and regulatory frameworks
? Centralising tendencies throughout government constrain both municipality and provincial
managerial authority.
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Table 7.1: Mapping management decision-space in the South African health sector,
2003
Resource
Allocation
Transport
Management
Managing PPPs &
PPIs
Managing Service
Delivery
National
treasury
wide
key role in
allocating
resources to
provinces &
municipalities
wide
Treasury & NDoT
set frameworks
wide
Treasury sets
national framework;
DPLG sets own
framework
moderate
advises Cabinet on
key issues
e.g. HIV/AIDS
National
health depart-
ment (NDoH)
narrow-moderate
some DM power
via conditional
grants e.g. for
HIV/AIDS, but
determined through
consultation with
PDoH & Treasury;
weak attempts to
develop guidance
to promote RA
equity
narrow
outsourced through
contract between
NDoT & private
provider
narrow-moderate
in part due to
weaknesses in
ensuring PDoH
compliance with
NDoH PPI
guidelines
moderate-wide
responsible for
setting national
policy direction &
support
implementation;
some funds &
personnel to
ensure
implementation e.g.
HIV/AIDS
Provincial
treasury
moderate-wide
works with national
Treasury guidelines
moderate
implements
national
guidelines with
PDoT
moderate
initiates PPPs &
manages
implementation
working within
national guidelines
narrow
limited role, but
influence via e.g.
resource
allocation power
Provincial
health depart-
ment (PDoH)
narrow-moderate
decides budget
allocations to
geographic areas,
levels of care
(PHC) & transfers
to municipalities for
health care
narrow-moderate
identifies needs,
allocates vehicles
within health dept &
has financial
accountability but
works within
provincial
guidelines
narrow-moderate
initiates PPPs &
PPI & manages
implementation
working within
national guidelines
moderate-wide
responsible for
adapting national
policy to provincial
needs, & ensuring
service
implementation
(including co-
ordination with
municipalities)
Provincially
employed
local
managers
narrow-none
budgeting largely
done on historical
basis
narrow
maintain & monitor
vehicles; motivates
to PDoH for
new/replacement
vehicles
narrow-none
manage
relationships with
NGOs
narrow-none
support
implementation of
provincial &
national directions
Municipality
(incl. health
dept)
moderate-narrow
depends on
balance of funding
between
allocations from
national Treasury,
provincial transfers
(for health care) &
own revenue
generation
wide
if have own
transport pool,
manage
independently (A &
large B
municipalities)
narrow
if using pool
vehicles (smaller B
and C
municipalities)
moderate
sometimes initiate
within DPLG
guidelines
moderate-narrow
depends on
balance of funding
provincial transfer
vs. own revenue &
historical role in
health care
provision
Facilities
(provincial or
municipality)
none
budgeting largely
done on historical
basis
none none
may manage
relationships with
NGOs
none
implement services
according to
guidelines
The Constitutional allocation of powers suggests that the South African governance system
can be characterised as a devolved system. It is intended that a substantial degree of
decision-making power be transferred from national government to both provincial and local
governments. For example, political representatives have a key role in approving budget
allocations at provincial and local government levels. However, the key features of the
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decision map outlined in Table 7.1 suggest that management within the South African health
sector remains quite centralised at national/provincial levels. The implementation of political
devolution is, therefore, limited by managerial centralisation. A key reason for this
centralisation is the strong influence of the national Treasury over decision-making at all
levels of government and in all sectors. The powers of provincial and local health departments
are also limited by the dominant role of the national Department of Health in at least some
areas of service provision. Even within provinces, there is little decentralisation to lower
managerial or service delivery levels. As a result, the definition of MHS outlined in the
National Health Bill has the potential to strengthen provincial control of primary health care
delivery by centralising resource allocation decision-making powers at this level. Although this
may protect the equity of resource allocations within provinces, such a positive impact is not
guaranteed. Such centralisation could also prevent the health system from being able to
respond flexibly and innovatively to local needs.
The views and perspectives of those working within the health system also demonstrate that
they experience it as a highly centralised system. Health systems are often pictured as a
pyramid, with the national level at the apex and the health facility network representing the
broad base. However, using interview data from all LGH studies, Figure 7.1 shows that those
working within the South African health system see it as a series of inverted pyramids.
People at every level, but particularly front line managers and providers, feel that
they work in isolation from others at their own level, and face a top heavy and rigid
management hierarchy that imposes multiple and often conflicting demands.
Front Line Manager and Provider
National Programme & Support Managers
multiple and
sometimes
conflicting
top-down
demands
The
Health
System
Pyramid
Figure 7.1
View from Below: The Inverted Pyramid
Within the South African Health System
Mid- Level
Managers
hierarchy
Politicians
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Explaining health system performance and decision-space
Evidence from the studies outlined in earlier chapters identifies three factors as explaining the
current state of decentralisation within the health system:
o An environment that has not supported decentralisation
o The complexity of inter-governmental relations in the new South African state
o The focus on strengthening the health system by establishing new organograms and
committees (the hardware), rather than changing the way people work together (the
software).
A constraining environment
Despite the Constitutional commitment to a devolved governance structure, a variety of
tensions and weaknesses have served to constrain the implementation of decentralisation
within the health sector. The slow development of local government as a sphere of
governance reflects and reinforces these tensions and weaknesses.
In some respects, decentralisation in the health sector appears
mythical. From the earliest health policy documents, local
government was identified as playing a key role in health care
delivery. This policy direction is not, however, reflected in the
views of government officials. Many people doubt local
government’s capacity to manage and deliver health services, and have therefore opposed
decentralisation. The national Treasury and even some local government managers worry
that municipalities do not have the funding or management capacity to provide even the basic
services for which they are solely responsible (Pillay 2001). Some health managers fear a
deterioration in the quality of service delivery if power is devolved to lower levels. In their view
the technical needs of health care delivery require strong central roles in guiding and
delivering health care. They may be reluctant to give away sectoral decision-making power
and be concerned about working with people who are not health professionals.
Another feature of the constraining environment is that existing policy frameworks have not
provided strong enough guidance for decentralisation. Engagement with other government
departments in pursuit of health system decentralisation has been patchy. DHS development
has been a separate unit within the national Department of Health rather than a strategy for
all health system development and programming. PHC financing has remained fragmented
and only weak efforts have been made to protect PHC funding levels from other health
system demands. Within provincial Health Departments, facilities have been given almost no
decision-making power. Where some national level actions (as in the area of HIV/AIDS) have
a tendency to be too controlling, in other areas national action is too weak as a support
mechanism (as in the case of PPIs).
This health sector experience reflects broader centralising tendencies within government. As
Table 7.1 indicates, the national Treasury has had a dominant influence across spheres of
governance. Sometimes its policy initiatives are seen positively in the health sector. However,
where its policy frameworks are in tension with those of the national health department the
differences can cause confusion for managers. For example, as the NDoH’s PPI framework
differs from the Treasury guidelines on PPPs, managers are not clear whether to apply them
(Chapter 6). The centralising tendencies within government also ignore the peculiar needs of
individual sectors. The health sector’s transport needs are very different from other sectors,
involving management of health facilities spread over great distances as well as the transport
of patients and medical supplies. Yet all sectors are currently governed by the same set of
guidelines.
Centralised management approaches are, moreover, written into the practices of the public
sector as inherited from the apartheid era.  In the LGH project studies, the need to wait for
decisions ‘from above’ or to get approval ‘from above’ before acting were identified as
undermining problem-solving at a local level and co-ordination in support of service delivery.
Similarly, poor communication practices serve to confuse those working within the health
system. They have contributed to the level of uncertainty associated with the debates over the
In some respects,
decentralisation in
the health sector
appears mythical.
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role of local government in the health sector. The feeling that you do not know what is
happening to your job or to the system in which you work is itself de-motivating and
undermines health managers’ trust in their superiors and colleagues.
Complex inter-governmental relations
The complexity of inter-governmental relations (IGRs) as established within the South African
Constitution has presented a second set of challenges to transforming the health system.
Figure 3.1 of Chapter 3 clearly illustrates this complexity by mapping the categories of co-
ordination necessary within the health sector. They include co-ordination:
? Across the three spheres of governance
? Within each sphere - between those with political and administrative authority, between
departments, and within departments
? Within local government - between district and local level municipalities
? Within the health sector - between individual service delivery programmes, between
service delivery programmes and support managers and between clinics and hospitals
? Across the nine provincial governments and, now, six metro, 47 district and 231 local
municipalities
? Between governmental and extra-governmental actors (e.g. health facilities and NGOs).
Given this complexity, establishing certain functioning coordinating mechanisms (such as
MinMEC10 and PHRC11) between national and provincial levels within the health sector is an
important achievement. These coordinating mechanisms have, to some extent, enabled
improved service delivery. In the area of the HIV/AIDS policy framework, conditional grants
and operational guidelines have allowed co-ordination across sectors and with actors outside
government. At local levels, and despite the lack of clear policy guidance, there are also
pockets of effective, often informal, co-ordination in problem-solving between provincial
Health Departments and local government staff.
But there have been problems in managing within the
current governance structure of South Africa. The
absence of a national policy framework to guide health
resource allocation within the fiscal federal structures
helps to explain the continuing inequities in primary
health care budgets, and it’s under-funding. Despite
broad consensus on the general roles of national and
provincial Health Departments in policy development
and service delivery, clarity on who has authority to
make what decisions within the health sector is lacking. In the area of HIV/AIDS such
weaknesses, together with national funding and personnel appointments to provincial levels,
have allowed the national level to become more involved in implementation than is acceptable
to provincial Health Departments. Finally, relatively simple problems have impeded effective
functioning in many of the co-ordination structures established within and across spheres.
Examples include attendance by staff lacking the authority to make decisions, irregular
attendance and poorly structured meetings.
Two particular problems have undermined co-ordination between national/provincial and
local governments. These are the lack of coordinating structures and common policy
frameworks. The White Paper on Local Government sees local government itself as the focal
point and mechanism for co-ordinated action within government (Chapter 3). However, many
provinces have not yet established functional structures to bring together provincial and local
government officials. Secondly, differences in policy frameworks between national/provincial
                                                
10 MinMEC – meeting between national Health Minister and provincial Members of Executive Council for
Health
11 PHRC – Provincial Health Restructuring Committee
Translating policy statements into decentralised practices within the health sector
has been hard because the environment was characterised by uncertainty,
opposition and rigidity.
The absence of a national
policy framework to guide
health resource allocation
within the fiscal federal
structures helps to explain
the continuing inequities in
primary health care budgets,
and it’s under-funding.
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and local governments have been obstacles to co-ordination. Parallel budgeting procedures
ensure fragmentation of PHC financing within the country.  Transport management
differences prevent shared transport use. Differential human resource frameworks are a key
barrier to the functional integration of health services.
Capacity weaknesses within the public service make these problems worse. At an
organisational level these include poor systems of planning and management, very weak
systems for monitoring and evaluating performance, poor communication procedures and
staff shortages/personnel turnover. At a personal level they include weak development of the
skills needed for specific areas of managerial responsibility (e.g. budgeting, PPI development)
and for the negotiation and communication skills essential to effective co-ordination.
Confidence shortfalls that result from such weaknesses can lead to a defensiveness in
personal relationships that further impedes co-ordination.
The organisational culture of the civil service inevitably contributes to the problems.
Hierarchy, and associated attempts to control other actors within the system, has blocked co-
ordination within departments and between spheres of governance. It has also undermined
trust between people and organisations. Communication weaknesses have sometimes
undermined co-ordination, while issues such as race, gender and political credentials also
influence relationships within and between organisations.
Hardware vs. software in health systems.
There has finally been a tendency to focus on hardware rather than software issues in health
system development (Blaauw et al. 2003). Hardware issues include legal frameworks,
structures, organograms, financing flows and technical skills development. Software issues
cover management styles, communication approaches, relationships, problem solving
approaches, building trust. Both are necessary to a health system, with one complementing
the other. A focus on one over the other can limit change.
In some respects the focus on hardware in South Africa has been necessary. Establishing the
legal framework for the District Health System was a critical step to service the new
management structure and approach. On the other hand, national Treasury’s focus on
funding and financial accountability has reinforced this hardware focus. There have also been
weaknesses in what hardware has been developed. For example, the MTEF (Medium Term
Expenditure Framework) process has been seen as the primary mechanism of forward
planning rather than a more integrated planning and budget process.
The LGH studies suggest that the reliance on informal mechanisms of co-ordination between
provincial and local government over the last ten years has been a problem. Coordination
has, for example, been seen primarily as a function of establishing a new structure, body or
meeting (see Chapter 3). This approach ignores the critical role of shared values (such as
mutual trust and good faith, as emphasised in the Constitution) in enabling coordination, and
of guiding visions and frameworks.
A key casualty of the hardware focus has been the limited attention given to human resource
management. Personnel shortages require urgent action. Training more staff or offering
financial or other material incentives are seldom enough by themselves to tackle either
migration or the problems of poor staff morale. Other software needs include building trusting
personal relationships and developing the associated skills of communication, negotiation,
and people management. Developing such skills will itself breed the personal confidence that
is important to leadership throughout the health system.
Finally, a focus on hardware over software has left little room for innovation and creativity. It
has reinforced top-down and hierarchical decision-making procedures. These have crowded
out local-level problem solving and bottom-up approaches to service delivery.
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Chapter 8
Looking Ahead and Tackling the Challenges
Lucy Gilson,
Centre for Health Policy
Background
Tackling the challenges of health system decentralisation is not an easy task, yet the
challenges must be tackled in order to take forward the decentralisation process.
A newly promulgated National Health Act will provide a strong foundation for future action. In
addition, the findings of the LGH studies point to eight other necessary steps. They are:
Taking action on the first four is an immediate requirement, whilst the last four can be
implemented over a longer period. Each is discussed in more detail in this final chapter. The
LGH studies indicate that for many of these actions there are some existing pockets of
experience on which to build. This experience is briefly outlined here and demonstrates that
the recommendations are feasible to implement.
“There are no easy answers -  If there were, we would have done it!”.
Yogan Pillay 2003 PHASA conference
1. Communicating a clear and simple vision
2. Identifying an implementation body to support health system
decentralisation
3. Developing a provincial mindset supportive of decentralisation
4. Capacity development
5. Strengthening co-ordination by clarifying roles and responsibilities
6. Developing planning as a co-ordination mechanism;
7. Strengthening monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
8. Encouraging leadership throughout the health system.
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1. Communicating a clear and simple vision
International experience of implementing change shows
the important role that guiding visions play in providing a
basis for common action towards shared goals (Lake et
al. 2000). In South Africa, uncertainty about the future
role of local government cannot continue. A new vision of
the key features of a decentralised health system can
now be built on the provisions of the National Health Bill.
Strong, clear and quick communication of the broad
outline of this vision and its goals is essential. Simple
and consistent messages need to be developed and
delivered to a wide range of audiences. These include
public health professionals throughout the system, local government councillors, national level
politicians, other government departments and the public. A wide range of communication
channels and media should be used.
The findings of the LGH studies indicate that the new decentralisation vision must directly
tackle two specific issues. Firstly, the tensions between the health service objective of quality
health care delivery and the developmental role of local government. Secondly, the
expectations that local government will soon begin to take responsibility for some health care
functions. The vision must therefore spell out the future role of local government, as well as
the steps that will be taken to build it (see also the following three proposed steps).
The Kopanong Declaration on PHC (August 2003) provides an excellent foundation for the
declaration of this vision of health system decentralisation. Not only does it re-state the
governmental commitment to primary health care and to the District Health System, but it also
outlines roles for all three spheres of governance. A declaration on decentralisation should
spell out more explicitly the one or two key roles and responsibilities envisaged for each
sphere and for the facility level over the next 5 years. This would clearly indicate the intention
to transfer some decision-making powers from higher to lower levels in that period.
2. Identifying an implementation unit to support health system
decentralisation
Establishing a common vision is the first of four
immediate tasks that must be initiated at the same
time as the National Health Act is promulgated. The
other three are: establishing a range of policy
frameworks that are supportive of decentralisation;
developing a new mindset within the health system
that is supportive of decentralised functioning;
capacity building throughout the system.
The last two tasks are discussed in more detail
below. The new policy frameworks that are needed
include those addressing resource allocation and specifically, PHC financing, transport
management and PPIs. It is also critical to ensure that the envisaged development of a single
civil service supports decentralisation within the health sector. Establishing such frameworks
will require engagement with the national Treasury and Department of Provincial and Local
Government.
Implementing these tasks will require dedicated time, energy and commitment to enable
change across the system. Providing support to decentralisation cannot be undertaken as just
one of several tasks, and also requires a variety of skills as well as strong political backing
(Gilson and Travis 1997). Although some units within the national Health Department have a
reasonable track record of supporting change at other levels, not all units yet play such an
Strong, clear and quick
communication of the broad
outline of this vision and its
goals is essential. Simple and
consistent messages need to
be developed and delivered
to a wide range of
audiences.
Implementation must show
that the district health
system is viewed, not as a
vertical programme, but as a
strategy for all health system
development and planning.
Ideally, more people, more
energy and more political
clout are needed.
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enabling role. In addition, the capacity of the existing national DHS directorate to implement
these functions is limited by its organisational and staffing position. Implementation must
show that the district health system is viewed, not as a vertical programme, but as a strategy
for all health system development and planning. Ideally, more people, more energy and more
political clout are needed.
One implementation unit could be tasked with all four tasks or several units could be charged
with implementing different tasks. Structural options that could be considered are:
? Establish a new health unit at national level that has a dedicated team, to implement all
tasks. The team should include staff with experience of working at provincial and local
government levels. The structure could be established on a temporary basis but should
have a relatively long life-span. The role and structure of the unit should also evolve in
response to the changing needs of the decentralisation process over time;
OR
? Work in collaboration with the existing DPLG units that support municipality development
(e.g. PIMS centres12). The units’ main tasks would be to establish national frameworks
supportive of health decentralisation and to develop local government capacity for health
service management;
AND
? Charge the national DHS directorate with the task of supporting other national DoH units
to adopt an enabling role towards lower levels. This work would involve establishing
national policy frameworks supportive of health decentralisation, and developing new
working procedures and practices within the national Health Department. Through the
existing DHS committee, the directorate would also continue to facilitate coordination and
discussion with provincial departments and organised local government.
3. Developing a provincial mindset supportive of
decentralisation
Provincial Health Departments obviously have a
critical influence of the future path of
decentralisation. They must act responsibly
towards lower levels, fulfilling their constitutional
function of enabling local government
development.
Acting responsibly towards lower levels begins
from the understanding that all levels have different functions and must work together to
enable service delivery. That is the essence of co-operative governance. Although health care
professionals have particular areas of medical expertise, effective primary health care
provision requires collaboration with those who represent or have knowledge of the
community, and have skills of community mobilisation. Building trusting relations with
municipalities under any decentralisation option is important.
Provincial Health Departments must also reassess how to work with their own facility
networks. It is never possible to tightly control and monitor a health system from above. Local
level staff can always ignore or change the instructions they receive. Protecting the quality of
service delivery requires a careful combination of central guidelines and space for local level
innovation. There is already much evidence of such innovation in support of service delivery
within the health system. Nurses pay from their own pockets to transport laboratory supplies,
or use their own vehicles to collect drugs or take patients to referral facilities; at a local level
provincially-employed health workers are getting together with their counterparts in local
government to solve operational problems. The challenge now is to value and promote such
problem-solving, rather than stifle it. Managers at lower levels must receive real support and
                                                
12 PIMS-Centres are the core element of a ‘planning and implementation management support’ system
established by the Department of Provincial and Local Government to support local municipalities.
There is already much evidence
of innovation in support of
service delivery within the
health system. The challenge
now is to value and promote such
problem-solving, rather than
stifle it.
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not just instructions. More support must be given to those areas with the weakest levels of
capacity.
Provinces must also take action to counter the resistance to decentralisation that results from
the rigid hierarchies of the civil service. The LGH studies provide evidence from several
provinces (see Chapters 1 and 3) that such action is possible. There is evidence of good
communication practices. Informal meetings between colleagues allow problem solving
despite the barriers of formal organograms and structures. The ‘Champions’ approach of the
Eastern Cape province, in which teams from the provincial health department visit local areas
to listen to staff needs, challenges hierarchy.
From their position in the health system structure, provincial Health Departments have an
important role in demanding accountability from the national level. They must motivate for
changes in national frameworks that support decentralisation and in the way the national
Health Department works. In this way, provincial departments can act as role models for other
levels of the system in relation to challenging hierarchy.
4. Capacity development
Capacity building requires a clear vision of decentralisation
that reduces the current uncertainty. Broader policy
frameworks around human resource development and
management are also needed.
Strengthening capacity development involves several tasks, including:
? Clear assignment of responsibility for this task to a unit or units
? Identification of the skill needs of different levels of the health system, based on their
assigned roles and responsibilities
? Establishing priorities for the types of training needed and who should be trained
? Reviewing available training and mentoring options and their relevance to priority skill
needs
? Development of innovative capacity development strategies to address priority skill gaps
? Regular monitoring of achievements and re-development of programmes as necessary.
It is important to note that some of the most important skills needed within a decentralised
system are not technical, whether clinical or managerial. Rather they are those of problem-
solving. These include having the confidence to challenge hierarchy and negotiate with other
people, and the attitudes required to develop personal relationships.
The development of such skills cannot easily be taught but often comes from experience and
learning on the job. Relevant approaches to ‘training’ include sharing experience with people
working at similar levels of the health system who have similar problems. This can be
undertaken through site visits, joint problem-solving workshops, informal exchanges and
communication.
An example of an alternative, innovative approach is to use service level agreements
between provincial Health Departments and municipalities as a mechanism for building the
capacity necessary to allow the gradual transfer of responsibilities to municipality level. Such
agreements are, in this form, an enabling mechanism rather than simply a tool for monitoring
and penalising poor performance. In this form, service level agreements would ensure that
provincial Departments act responsibly towards lower levels.
The approach and its feasibility are indicated by its use in transferring management and
decision-making power for primary care delivery to First Nation governance authorities in
Canada (Lavoie, personal communication). The transfer process has three stages. Initially
First Nation authorities (read as municipalities in the South African context) apply to the
governing body of the Canadian health system (say, provincial Health Departments) for
funding for a pre-transfer process of one year. In this initial year they assess community
health needs and prepare plans for health management and delivery. A second bridging
Of all eight identified areas
of necessary action,
capacity development is
perhaps the most critical.
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phase of nine months involves negotiation between the applying authority and Health Canada
to establish agreement on how services will be managed and how accountability will be
exercised. Finally, a contract of 3-5 years is established to govern the third phase of routine
service delivery, including evaluation of implementation experience. The slow phasing of the
process allows development of the capacity required to support service delivery and
management and ensures that national authorities have opportunities to review and evaluate
progress towards and in implementation. Similar processes of support and engagement often
govern contracts for the delivery of social services between government and NGOs in the UK
and elsewhere. The key element of such a process is the development of a service that
meets the population needs, through negotiation, dialogue and capacity development.
5. Strengthening co-ordination by clarifying roles and
responsibilities
Such co-ordination will need clear delineation of the
roles and responsibilities of different levels and
groups within the system. Decentralisation always
involves some combination of centralisation and
decentralisation, and the pattern differs between
functions. The LGH studies provide some
indications of the needs of different management functions.
Funding PHC requires active central level action to establish the principles and frameworks of
equity that can guide implementation.  However, protecting equity does not require that
budgeting is entirely controlled at national level. National and provincial financing frameworks
to promote resource allocation equity can be combined with bottom up budgeting approaches
in which even facilities can be actively involved. The reports of the 1996-97 District Financing
Project provide suggestions about how to develop such approaches (e.g. Brijlal et al. 1997). A
critical function of the national/provincial decision-making authority within bottom up budgeting
is to communicate clearly and effectively what budget limits are, how they have been
established and how they can be challenged by those at other levels.
Some aspects of transport management may also need to be centralised, such as the
purchase of new vehicles through a single tender, to achieve economies of scale. But many
tasks in transport management are better implemented at much lower levels. For example,
the health district should determine the number and type of vehicles required within their
district for delivery of services rather than just being allocated what is available from the
Department of Transport.
In contrast, there is an important role for a strong national unit in developing health specific
frameworks and guidelines around PPIs that can support decision-making across provinces.
Skills and systems within provinces must also be built. The danger is that without such
national level action, PPIs will be poorly managed and have negative impacts on the health
system.
Finally, more effective co-ordination will also require a balance of formal and informal
strategies. Stronger co-ordination with local government within provinces requires the
establishment of more formal structures and mechanisms (such as service level agreements)
to complement the largely informal approach currently adopted. But where existing structures
are not working effectively then action must be take to strengthen them (such as clarifying
who must attend to make the structure effective and getting their commitment, and planning
meetings to allow for constructive engagement) as well as to establish the informal
approaches that complement them. Personal relationships are often an important means of
getting things done, and should be encouraged when in the best interests of health system
development.
The South African Constitution
requires a co-ordinated
approach to all aspects of health
system development.
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6. Developing planning as a co-ordination mechanism
Another strategy for strengthening co-ordination is to
strengthen planning processes.  Thus, the national DOH
planning guidelines of April 2003 encourage district plans
to be aligned both with provincial and municipal plans
(IDPs).
However, to be effective, planning requires a combination
of hardware (e.g. frameworks, links to budgets, information) and software (negotiation,
dialogue and communication skills, effective personal relationships).
In addition, in the South African context, two elements of context must be tackled to enable
planning. The first is the uncertain health system context, which can be tackled by
establishing a decentralisation vision as outlined in the first step described in this chapter. The
second is the rule-bound and hierarchical civil service bureaucracy. National and provincial
managers must encourage local level actors to solve problems themselves, and champion
those that do. They must also set examples for others - such as indicating clear and simple 3
or 5 point plans, sticking to them and using them as a basis for evaluating their own
performance.
If the contextual issues are addressed effectively, the April 2003 planning guidelines provide a
solid foundation for developing planning processes. They delineate who has what roles and
responsibilities in planning. They provide guidance on how to link the planning process to the
existing budgeting process and formats. They should be widely communicated.
However, it will be important to guard against the types of problems that can prevent planning
from acting as a coordination mechanism. Two important dangers in this respect are that the:
? Focus of the process becomes the writing of the plan document rather than the problem-
solving and coordination necessary to improve service delivery
? Development of a detailed plan document consumes so much time that routine
management functions are neglected.
7. Strengthening monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) can facilitate co-
ordination by providing a focus for engagement and
dialogue between the various people within the system
that have to work together, and so allow better
understanding of each other’s needs and constraints.
Most importantly, M&E can allow the health system to
learn from past experience what is needed to strengthen future service provision.
In South Africa, procedures for M&E of district health system development have been
institutionalised in some provinces, with some benefits. However, the negative experiences
include the isolation of the procedures from routine planning and management, and the lack
of feedback to districts (Pillay 2001).
Clearly the national level has an important role in M&E. In some areas it has the leading role;
for example, in relation to PPIs. In other areas it has initiated systems that allow other levels
to conduct M&E. The development of the District Health Information System and Hospital
Information Systems, thus, offer important entry points for M&E at all levels. But to enable
learning, M&E must be conducted throughout the system and must use information beyond
formal data.
Such M&E must focus more on the processes of health care delivery and management, than
on their impacts. It also must move beyond a measurable set of indicators, to include the
processes and forms of dialogue that allow such indicators to be used in problem-solving.
For coordination, the
opportunity of planning is
that it requires people
within the system to get
together and think
together.
Monitoring and evaluation
is an important input into
any planning process and
has its own importance
within management.
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Indicators must be changed over time to reflect health system development. The roles and
responsibilities of different levels must, again, be spelt out. It is critical that clear
responsibilities are given to the lower levels of the system so that M&E becomes a strategy
that encourages bottom up innovation. Yet higher-level leadership may be required to
propose and champion such an M&E approach. It requires recognition throughout the health
system of the importance of collaborative reflection on performance and joint problem-solving
in pursuit of personal, team and, ultimately, health system goals.
8. Encouraging leadership throughout the health system
The final action in support of decentralisation is,
therefore, to encourage effective leadership
throughout the health system. Champions at all levels
of the system need to be given the space to take the
innovative action required to overturn the myth of
health system decentralisation. Systems of
accountability, such as M&E, need to be developed
which allow those failing in their tasks to be
challenged, particularly from below. National and
provincial leaders need to accept their particular
responsibilities but also allow those at other levels the
authority to take on new responsibilities. They must
offer consistent and strong leadership in their
particular geographical areas. But local level managers and front-line health providers must
also be given the opportunity to demonstrate their leadership qualities and the support
necessary to develop those qualities. Above all, leaders throughout the health system have to
act responsibly towards it and towards the population it serves. This implies that they must
step outside their own personal concerns, challenge their own biases and speak for the
values and needs of the system as a whole.
Leaders throughout the
health system have to act
responsibly towards it and
towards the population it
serves.  They must step
outside their own personal
concerns, challenge their
own biases and speak for
the values and needs of the
system as a whole.
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